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Charitable enterprises deserve – indeed, they require – analysis, 
evaluation, planning; they are not matters to be lightly undertaken or 
perfunctorily carried on; they merit the genuine interest and undivided 
attention of the persons to whom society has entrusted their 
accomplishment. Consequently, the efforts of the speculator or the 
trader – whether successful or unsuccessful – are intrinsically 
inconsistent with the proper management of the affairs of a foundation. 
– Report on Private Foundations,
Senate Finance Committee (1965)1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
How much should charity and business intersect? Recent trends 
point toward a growing entanglement between the for-profit and 
nonprofit sectors. This trend is evident in the growth of social enterprise2 
and the advent of hybrid organizational forms designed to foster social 
enterprise, such as the L3C3 and the benefit corporation.4 A growing 
1. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 89TH CONG., TREASURY DEP’T REP. ON PRIVATE 
FOUNDS. 53 (Comm. Print 1965) (hereinafter 1965 REPORT). 
2. The Social Enterprise Alliance defines “social enterprises” as “businesses whose primary
purpose is the common good. They use the methods and disciplines of business and the power of the 
marketplace to advance their social, environmental and human justice agendas.” The Case for Social 
Enterprise Alliance, SOC. ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, https://www.se-alliance.org/what-is-social-
enterprise (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). The Centre for Social Enterprise identifies a number of 
potential definitions of the term “social enterprise.” What Is Social Enterprise?, B.C. CTR. FOR SOC. 
ENTERPRISE, http://www.centreforsocialenterprise.com/C3_BC.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). In 
general, the term connotes a business enterprise that uses for-profit business methodologies to 
further a social purpose. The enterprise’s “[a]ssets and wealth are used to create community benefit” 
rather than being distributed to shareholders, and the enterprise is “accountable to both its members 
and a wider community” by maintaining a double-bottom line, producing healthy financial and 
social returns. John Thompson & Bob Doherty, The Diverse World of Social Enterprise: A 
Collection of Social Enterprise Stories, 33 INT’L J. OF SOC. ECON. 361, 362 (1974), available at 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/03068290610660643.  
3. Low-profit limited liability companies, or L3Cs, are a separate form of state law legal
entity. Generally, an L3C is an LLC that is organized for a business purpose but is operated to 
accomplish one or more charitable purposes and would not have been formed but for those 
2
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number of business schools now teach social impact investing and 
venture philanthropy as part of their regular curriculum.5 Commentators 
ask whether charities should be run more like businesses6 and whether 
businesses should evaluate success on a bottom line that includes not 
only profit but charity.7 Some have gone as far as to suggest models for 
for-profit charity.8 
Although it has received a great deal of press recently, the issue of 
the entanglement of business and charity is not new. In the early 1960s, 
charitable purposes. In addition, no significant purpose of the L3C can be the production of income 
or appreciation of property, although it may, in fact, produce a profit or benefit from the 
appreciation of property. Finally, an L3C may not engage in political or lobbying activities. See, 
e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (West, Westlaw through 2013-14 Vt. Gen. Assembly
(2014)). In general, the L3C facilitates social enterprise by elevating charity as the primary (but not 
sole) purpose for the entity. L3C enabling statutes, such as Vermont’s, were originally drafted with 
the intent to facilitate “program related investments” (as defined in Code Section 4944(c)) by 
private foundation investors. For a critique of L3Cs as vehicles for program related investments, see 
Cassady V. Brewer, Seven Ways to Strengthen and Improve the L3C, 25 REGENT U.L. REV. 329 
(2012/2013). 
4. Benefit corporations are another type of state law legal entity designed to facilitate social
enterprise. Most benefit corporation legislation requires the entity to include a general charitable 
purpose as part of its corporate purposes, but that general charitable purpose need not be the 
primary, or even a significant, purpose for the organization. Typically, the traditional standard of 
care applicable to the board of directors of a business corporation is amended to provide that the 
board of the benefit corporation should take into account the effect of corporate actions on 
consumers, labor, the community and the environment. Unlike the L3C, there is no limitation on 
profit motive for a benefit corporation. For more information on benefit corporations, see J. Haskell 
Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certification and Benefit Corporation 
Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012); J. Haskell Murray, Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise: 
Comparing the State Statutes (May 1, 2014) (unpublished chart), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988556. 
5. See Nan Stone et al., The MBA Drive for Social Value: Five Trends Boosting Social
Benefit Content at U.S. Business Schools, BRIDGESPAN GROUP (Apr. 14, 2009), 
http://www.bridgespan.org/Publications-and-Tools/Career-Professional-
Development/NonprofitCareers/The-MBA-Drive-for-Social-Value.aspx#.VF1P9odM5wy. An 
informal review of Business Week’s top 25 business schools indicates that 23 of the 25 had courses 
in social impact investing; the other two schools had significant offerings in the social enterprise 
field, so impact investing might be covered in other courses. Id. 
6. See, e.g., Charles R. Bronfman, Jeffrey R. Solomon & Michael Edwards, Should
Philanthropies Operate Like Businesses?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052970204554204577024313200627678. 
7. See, e.g., Lori Kozlowski, Impact Investing: The Power of Two Bottom Lines, FORBES
(Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorikozlowski/2012/10/02/impact-investing-the-power-
of-two-bottom-lines/.  
8. Eric A. Posner & Anup Malani, The Case for For-Profit Charities (Univ. of Chi. Law
and Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 304, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=928976; but see, Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 1213 (2010); Benjamin Moses Leff, The Case Against For-Profit Charity, 42 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 819 (2012). See also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 387 (2014). 
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a subcommittee of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House 
of Representatives, led by Representative Wright Patman, held a series 
of hearings uncovering abuses in the private foundation sector and 
reviewing the impact of those abuses on the economy (the “Patman 
hearings”).9 
Many of the abuses uncovered in the Patman hearings involved 
private foundation entanglement in operating businesses and related 
investment opportunities. A report later issued by the Senate Finance 
Committee in 1965 detailed a common tax planning strategy used by 
wealthy families.10 The family would transfer a controlling voting 
interest in the family business to a private foundation but retain the non-
voting equity interests in the business that represented a significant 
portion of the value of the company. Generally, members of the family 
would control the voting interests by sitting on the governing body of 
the private foundation. This strategy preserved family control over the 
business, retained the vast majority of the value of the company in 
private hands, and generated a charitable income tax deduction, with 
estate and gift tax deductions to boot.11 The family could then cause the 
private foundation to use its assets to make speculative investments,12 to 
provide capital for related businesses through loans or equity 
investments,13 and to engage in anti-competitive behavior.14 The 
foundation’s governing body would focus primarily upon the 
maintenance and growth of these family business interests, at the 
expense of the charitable endeavors that formed the basis for the private 
9. The results of the Patman hearings were published in three separate installments (the
“Patman Reports”). CHAIRMAN’S REPORT TO H. SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 87TH CONG., 
TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY, FIRST 
INSTALLMENT (Comm. Print 1962) [hereinafter PATMAN REPORT or FIRST INSTALLMENT]; 
CHAIRMAN’S REPORT TO H. SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 88TH CONG., TAX-EXEMPT 
FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY, SECOND 
INSTALLMENT (Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter PATMAN REPORT 2 or SECOND INSTALLMENT]; 
CHAIRMAN’S REPORT TO H. SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 88TH CONG., TAX-EXEMPT 
FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY, THIRD INSTALLMENT 
(Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter PATMAN REPORT 3 or THIRD INSTALLMENT]. Indeed, this 
discussion reaches even further back. For an excellent discussion of the history of private 
foundations in the United States, see Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation’s 
Governance and Self-Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093 
(2001). 
10. See 1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 15-16.
11. Id. at 15-16.
12. Id. at 15.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 15-16.
4
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foundation’s tax-exempt status.15 
The private foundation abuses detailed in the Patman hearings 
generated significant controversy and spurred Congress to curb the 
relationship between private foundations and affiliated businesses and 
families. In 1965, the Senate Finance Committee, based in part on upon 
the abuses uncovered in the Patman hearings, suggested a series of 
excise taxes16 that were designed to combat private foundation 
excesses.17 Many of these suggestions were passed into law,18 each of 
which was designed to combat a particular abuse detailed in the Patman 
hearings and later in the 1965 Report.19 In total, Congress enacted five 
penalty excise taxes,20 which now form Chapter 42 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, known as the “private foundation excise tax rules.”21 
These excise taxes are designed to prohibit and penalize private 
foundation behaviors deemed by Congress to be undesirable. 
Of the five excise taxes, Code Section 4943, the excess business 
holdings rule, was aimed specifically at curbing the entanglement of 
private foundations and related businesses.22 As described more fully in 
15. Id.
16. Black’s Law Dictionary defines an excise tax as “[a] tax imposed on the manufacture,
sale, or use of goods (such as a cigarette tax), or on an occupation or activity (such as a license tax 
or an attorney occupation fee).” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 15(c) (9th ed. 2009). West’s Tax Law 
Dictionary takes a broader view, stating that the term “[m]ay be applied to most taxes except 
income tax or property tax. In general, the term means a tax on the manufacture, sale, or use of 
goods or with respect to an occupation or activity.” ROBERT SELLERS SMITH & ADELE TURGEON 
SMITH, WEST’S TAX LAW DICTIONARY § E2030 (Westlaw 2015). In this particular case, it is a 
penalty in the form of an excise tax, which is designed to deter or punish a private foundation for an 
undesirable activity. See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (U.S. 
2012). 
17. 1965 REPORT, supra note 1 at 26-30.
18. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
19. For a good discussion of the abuses identified by the Patman hearings and how the
various excise taxes overlap in various ways to address these abuses, see Richard Schmalbeck, 
Reconsidering Private Foundation Investment Limitations, 58 TAX L. REV. 59 (2004). 
20. In addition to the Section 4943 excise tax on excess business holdings, the other four
private foundation penalty excise taxes are as follows: (1) Section 4941 governs self-dealing 
transactions between a private foundation and certain disqualified persons; (2) Section 4942 
prohibits a foundation from accumulating its income indefinitely by requiring the foundation to 
make minimum distributions for charitable purposes annually; (3) Section 4944 penalizes 
speculative investments that jeopardize a foundation’s charitable purposes; and (4) Section 4945 
taxes expenditures made for non-charitable purposes. In addition to the five penalty excise taxes, 
Congress also imposed an excise tax on the net investment income of a private foundation. See 26 
U.S.C. § 4940 (2012). This investment income excise tax was not intended as a penalty, but as a 
mechanism for funding the enforcement of the other penalty excise taxes. 
21. 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2012).
22. Except as otherwise noted, all references to the “Code” or to a “Section” mean the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as from time to time amended. 
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Part III, Code Section 4943 limits a private foundation’s ability to hold 
equity interests in those business entities that are also owned by 
individuals and entities affiliated with the foundation. The amount and 
nature of the equity interest that a foundation may hold in a business 
varies with the type of business entity. The statutory language of Code 
Section 4943 sets forth fairly detailed rules limiting the equity holdings 
of a private foundation in a business corporation.23 It then provides only 
very general rules regarding a private foundation’s holdings in 
unincorporated entities, such as trusts, partnerships, and sole 
proprietorships,24 leaving Treasury to fill in the details by regulation. 
The focus on corporate holdings in Code Section 4943 reflects the 
results of the Patman hearings and the 1965 Report, both of which detail 
myriad abuses involving foundation investment in business corporations. 
As detailed in Part II, virtually none of the testimony in the Patman 
hearings involved partnerships. As most of the perceived abuse 
uncovered by the Patman hearings was in the corporate sector, the 
dichotomy in statutory treatment between corporate ownership of an 
operating business and “direct” ownership of a business (including sole 
proprietorships, partnerships, fractional interests, and trusts) sufficed at 
the time for purposes of the statute.25 
Code Section 4943 addressed the business and investment world as 
Congress found it in 1969. Given the differential between corporate 
income tax rates and individual income tax rates at the time,26 most 
businesses were set up as corporations. The income from a general 
partnership was passed through to the partners and taxed at the higher 
23. 26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(2) (2012).
24. Id. § 4943(c)(3). (“The permitted holdings of a private foundation in any business
enterprise which is not incorporated shall be determined under regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary. Such regulations shall be consistent in principle with paragraphs (2) and (4), except 
that . . . [then setting forth general guidance for partnerships, sole proprietorships, and any other 
unincorporated entity].”). See infra Part III for more details regarding this provision. 
25. As an example of the view that partnerships constituted “direct” ownership, see 1965
REPORT, supra note 1, at 7 (“Many private foundations have become deeply involved in the active 
conduct of business enterprises. Ordinarily, the involvement takes the form of ownership of a 
controlling interest in one or more corporations which operate businesses; occasionally, a 
foundation owns and operates a business directly.”); see also id. at 30. 
26. From 1954 to 1964 (during which the Patman hearings occurred), the maximum federal
corporate tax rate was 52%, while the maximum individual rate was 91%. From 1965 to 1978, when 
the Chapter 42 excise taxes were passed, the maximum federal corporate rate was 48%, while the 
maximum individual rate was 70%. These rates began to drop over the next few years, although the 
maximum individual rate was still higher than the corporate rate. See the incredibly helpful chart of 
historical income tax rates in JEFFREY L. KWALL, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, AND THEIR OWNERS 6-7 (4th ed. 
2012). 
6
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individual rates in effect at the time, and of course, the general partners 
had no liability protection. At the time, limited partnerships, the income 
from which was also passed through and taxed at the higher individual 
rates, sharply curtailed management participation by passive investors as 
the price to be paid for enhanced liability protection.27 As a result, 
general and limited partnerships were used rarely at the time of the 
Patman hearings and primarily in specialized areas, such as real estate or 
oil and gas.28 Foundation involvement with these relatively rare and 
generally small scale (at least comparatively) investment entities was not 
the source of abuse that Patman had targeted in his hearings—not when 
compared with the likes of the Rockefeller Foundation’s ownership and 
control of Standard Oil.29 
But then the world changed. 
Wyoming passed the first limited liability company (“LLC”) statute 
in 1977,30 throwing the tax world into disarray. The Code contemplated 
a business world with two primary business entities, corporations and 
partnerships. The LLC challenged that dichotomy: here was an entity 
with the liability protection of a corporation and the management 
flexibility of a partnership. With the Tax Reform Act of 1986, individual 
income tax rates fell below the combined corporate rate for the first time 
since the inception of the income tax,31 making the pass-through taxation 
of partnerships increasingly more attractive from an income tax 
perspective.32 
27. Historically, a limited partner was supposed to be a passive investor in the partnership. If
a limited partner exercised too much control over the partnership, he could be deemed a general 
partner and lose the benefit of limited liability. At the time of the original passage of Chapter 42, 
most states would have been working under the original version of the Uniform Limited Partnership 
Act (“ULPA”), passed in 1916. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT (1916). Later revisions of ULPA came in 
1976 and in 1985, which loosened but did not abolish the limitations on limited partnership 
involvement in management. The 2001 revision to ULPA, however, did away with the control 
limitation; but that revision was well after both the 1986 re-codification of the Internal Revenue 
Code, which brought lower individual rates, and after the check-the-box rules of 1997. UNIF. LTD. 
P’SHIP ACT (2001) (amended 2013). For further information on the limited partnership control rule, 
see Carter G. Bishop, The New Limited Partner Liability Shield: Has the Vanquished Control Rule 
Unwittingly Resurrected Lingering Limited Partner Estoppel Liability As Well As Full General 
Partner Liability?, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 667 (2004). See also LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, JEFFREY M. 
LIPSHAW, ELIZABETH S. MILLER & JOSHUA P. FERSHEE, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTITIES 
(5th ed. 2013). 
28. Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J.
1459, 1463-66, 1517-18 (1998). 
29. See PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at v. See also 1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 36.
30. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 577 (codified
as amended at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-103 (repealed 2010)). 
31. See Kwall, supra note 26.
32. Prior to 1986, corporate rates were generally lower than individual rates, and often
7
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In 1986, however, it was not entirely clear that LLCs were entitled 
to this newly advantageous pass-through taxation regime.33 Over time, 
the Code adapted to the existence of LLCs, primarily through the 
adoption of the “check-the-box” regulations effective January 1, 1997, 
which finally clearly allowed LLCs to take advantage of partnership tax 
structure.34 Since that time, the LLC has, by and large, found its place in 
the Code. 
Or has it? There are vestiges of the old tax world left, specifically 
including the private foundation excise tax on excess business holdings 
under Code Section 4943. To this day, the fundamental structure of 
Code Section 4943 remains virtually untouched.35 The distinction 
between corporations and “direct ownership” entities, such as 
partnerships, remains, as does the deferral to Treasury to promulgate 
regulations on the application of Code Section 4943 to non-corporate 
entities. Neither the statute nor the regulations has been updated to take 
into account private foundation ownership of LLCs. 
At the same time, the percentage allocation of private foundation 
endowments to alternative investments strategies has grown,36 and LLCs 
significantly so. See id. at 5 n.26. After the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and until 1993, individual rates 
were slightly lower than corporate rates (1987: 40% to 38.5%; 1988-1990: 34% to 28%; 1991-1992: 
34% to 31%). See id. at 7. After 2003, the individual rates slightly exceeded the corporate rates once 
again. See id. This, of course, does not take into account the effects of alternative taxation regimes 
on dividends or capital gains. 
33. See Carol R. Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company: Evidence of a Race
Between the States, But Heading Where?, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1193, 1199-1205 (1995). 
34. See Susan Kalinka, The Louisiana Limited Liability Company Law After “Check-the-
Box,” 57 LA. L. REV. 715, 719-20 (1995). For discussion on the check-the-box rule for entity 
classification, see infra Part III.E.1. 
35. Congress has amended Code Section 4943, but not extensively. Code Section 4943 was
amended as part of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, to extend its 
application to supporting organizations and donor advised funds and to increase the amount of the 
tax. Earlier, there were corrections in 1969, 1976, 1980, 1984, most of which address grandfathering 
and correction.  
36. The 2012 Council on Foundations–Commonfund Study of Investments for Private
Foundations showed fairly strong returns for alternative investment strategies: 
Within the broad category of alternative strategies, distressed debt returned 14.7 percent, 
followed by an 8.0 percent gain from marketable alternative strategies (hedge funds, 
absolute return, market neutral, long/short, 130/30, event driven and derivatives). Just 30 
basis points behind at 7.7 percent was private equity (LBOs, mezzanine and M&A funds, 
and international private equity). Returns from other subcategories were private equity 
real estate (non-campus), at 6.7 percent; venture capital, at 6.5 percent; energy and 
natural resources, at 4.6 percent; and commodities and managed futures, at 1.3 percent. 
Press Release, Commonfund Inst., Study Finds Private Foundations Rebuilding Assets After 
Recession Declines (Sept. 26, 2013), available at https://www.commonfund.org/InvestorResources/
CommonfundNews/Documents/2012%20CCSF%20Press%20Release%20-%20FINAL.pdf. The 
collective allocation of the 140 participating foundations (representing $78.7 billion in collective 
8
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have grown to be the primary choice of entity for many of these 
alternative investments.37 In addition, single member LLCs are 
commonly used as a liability blocker for those activities that a private 
foundation does not wish to undertake directly.38 Therefore, the lack of 
clarity in the treatment of LLCs under Code Section 4943 has grown to 
pose a significant practical problem for those private foundations39 that 
oversee a diverse investment portfolio. 
Updating a provision that governs a small segment of the tax-
exempt organization world might not be at the top of Treasury’s to-do 
list. That being said, changes in the investment world, the nonprofit 
sector, and the Code have brought new attention to Section 4943. 
Moreover, the fundamental question asked in the 1960s and answered in 
part by the passage of Code Section 4943—how much should the 
charitable sector and business world intersect?—is as relevant now as it 
was then. With the evolution of the investment theory and the renewed 
focus on the issue of the interaction between business and charity, finally 
addressing the manner in which LLCs are treated under Section 4943 is 
a change that is better late than never. 
Part I of this Article traces the historical development of Code 
Section 4943 and the business entanglement issues that the Code Section 
was designed to combat. It then discusses developments in the law that 
occurred after the passage of Section 4943 that have implications for its 
structure, most importantly the introduction of the LLC. Part II describes 
the current statutory scheme of Section 4943, and the ambiguity in the 
manner in which it applies, and the practical problems and abuses that 
potentially arise from this ambiguity. In Part III, the Article reviews 
various options for clarifying the treatment of Section 4943 and 
evaluates them in light of the ongoing debate regarding the intersection 
of charity and business. This Article concludes, in Part IV, with a 
recommendation for change that provides administrative clarity and 
minimizes the possibility of abuse while allowing for modern investment 
assets) to alternative strategies was 42%, down from 44% the prior year. This included an allocation 
across all institutions of 22% to private equity of all types and 39% to marketable alternative 
strategies, such as hedge funds. Id. 
37. The LLC has been the primary entity of choice for new businesses since as early as 2004.
See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of the Number of 
New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between 2004-2007 and How LLCs 
Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002-2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 466-78 (2010). 
38. The IRS recently confirmed that a donation directly to a single member LLC that is
wholly owned by a private foundation or other eligible charity may qualify for a Section 170 
income tax deduction. I.R.S. Notice 2012-52, 2012-35 I.R.B. 317. 
39. With the passage of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, this problem now extends to
donor advised funds and supporting organizations. 26 U.S.C. § 4943(e)-(f) (2012). 
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practices. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A.  Brief History of the Private Foundation Excise Taxes 
1. Preliminary Discussions
Private foundations have been a part of American philanthropy in 
one form or another since roughly the turn of the century; criticism of 
the American private foundation has been around for about that long as 
well. The beginnings of the modern private foundation can be found in 
the efforts of turn-of-the-century industrialists such as Andrew Carnegie 
and John D. Rockefeller. Carnegie’s endowment, the Carnegie 
Corporation, was founded in 1911, and the Rockefeller Foundation 
followed shortly thereafter in 1913.40 It did not take long for the 
criticism to start—in 1913, President William Howard Taft established a 
commission (known as the Walsh Commission, after its chairman, Frank 
P. Walsh) to hold hearings on these newly formed vehicles for private 
philanthropy.41 
The Walsh Commission eventually issued a report that roundly 
criticized private foundations as abusive and designed primarily to 
concentrate power and influence rather than further philanthropic 
goals.42 The report did suggest a number of restrictions on these private 
philanthropic entities, including limitations on investments and 
accumulations of income.43 
Congress did not adopt any of these changes; rather, they passed 
legislation authorizing the personal income tax deduction for charitable 
contributions in 1917 and extended the deduction to corporations in 
1938.44 It is likely not pure coincidence that the number of private 
foundations in existence grew dramatically immediately thereafter.45 The 
ensuing rapid growth of business activity by private foundations did not 
go unnoticed, as the first version of the unrelated business income tax 
was passed in 1939.46 
40. Crimm, supra note 9, at 1103-04.
41. Id. at 1104.
42. Id. at 1105.
43. Id. at 1105; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON INDUS. RELATIONS, 64TH CONG., INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS (Comm. Print 1916). 
44. Crimm, supra note 9, at 1105, 1107.
45. Id. at 1107
46. Id.
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President Harry S. Truman’s tax message to Congress on January 
23, 1950, criticized foundations as “a cloak for business ventures.”47 
Later that year, Congress updated the unrelated business income tax, 
made an attempt at regulating self-dealing transactions, required 
additional public disclosure, and tried to prohibit excessive 
accumulations of income.48 This set of reforms has been described by 
one commentator as “broader than it was deep” and “largely 
ineffective.”49 Most certainly, these reforms did not stem the tide of 
concern over the growing influence of private foundations. 
2. The Patman Hearings
In 1961, Representative Wright Patman initiated a survey of 534 
private foundations.50 This study was adopted as a project of the Small 
Business Committee as part of the 87th Congress51 and formed the basis 
for what would become later become the Patman Report, a multi-volume 
report cataloguing myriad real and perceived private foundation abuses. 
In the transmittal letter forwarding an interim report from his 
subcommittee to the full House Small Business Committee, 
Representative Patman noted that 111 of the 534 foundations “owned 
10% or more of at least one class of stock in one or more of 264 
different corporations” as of the end of 1960, including Ford, Eli Lilly, 
and Kellogg.52 After reciting this statistic, Patman stated, 
“[u]nquestionably, the economic life of our Nation has become so 
intertwined with foundations that unless something is done about it they 
will hold a dominant position in every phase of American life.”53 Patman 
went on to compare private foundations to the Standard Oil monopolies 
broken up by the Roosevelt administration, instituting the modern 
antitrust era.54 
In his transmittal letter, Representative Patman noted the significant 
47. PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 1.
48. Schmalbeck, supra note 19, at 60 n.4.
49. Id. In the 1965 Report, Treasury agreed, stating that the 1950 self-dealing rules provided
“unsatisfactory results,” and the 1950 rules on minimum distributions were “inadequate as well as 
difficult and expensive to administer.” 1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 17, 25. 
50. PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 2.
51. Id. at 1. The authorizing resolution was passed at the first meeting of the committee in
1962. See 108 CONG. RECORD 520 (1962). 
52. PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at v.
53. Id.
54. Id. The transmittal letter specifically highlights the private foundations created by the
Rockefeller family and the holdings of those different foundations in Standard Oil and related 
entities. Id.  
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amount of lost federal revenue attributable to the tax-exempt status of 
private foundations.55 Patman argued that the lost tax revenues were not 
justified by the charitable use because the donor could 
by a loan or exchange, secure a return of assets that have been donated 
should the occasion arise, that he can secure additional capital when 
needed, at ‘reasonable’ rates; that foundation funds have been used to 
help a donor when he found himself in a proxy fight; and foundation 
funds have been used to confer benefits on employees of companies, a 
substantial competitive advantage.56 
Many of these issues could be addressed—and were, in fact addressed—
by the stricter regulation of related party transactions.57 The Patman 
Report clearly discussed self-dealing transactions such as foundation 
lending, capital investments, use of foundation services on a preferable 
basis, and sales that were not at fair market value.58 
Even if such transactions had not occurred or had occurred on an 
arm’s length basis, Representative Patman would still have been 
troubled. The interrelationship between a private foundation and 
business was, in and of itself, the issue. The Patman Report identified 
the use of private foundations to perpetuate and consolidate corporate 
control as a subject in need of “careful examination.”59 The report noted 
that foundation money and other assets were used to carry on proxy 
fights, citing specific examples that had occurred in 1960 and 1961.60 In 
addition, the Patman Report expressed concern about the unfair 
55. Id. at vi. For example, Gulf Oil created a foundation to hold 100% of the voting common
stock of Pontiac Refining Corporation, then valued at $32 million. In 1960, it had an income of 
$750,000, of which $380,000 was expended for tax-exempt purposes. Id. 
56. Id.
57. Section 4941, passed in 1969 as part of the same set of private foundation excise taxes
that included Section 4943, now prohibits all self-dealing transactions (subject to limited statutory 
exceptions), even if those transactions are fair and reasonable to the foundation and at fair market 
value. Prior to the enactment of Section 4941, then Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954 loosely regulated these transactions by providing that a trust holding amounts for charitable 
purposes could not lend without “adequate security” and a “reasonable rate of interest”; pay 
“excess” compensation; make services available on a “preferential basis”; make “substantial 
purchases” of property for more than “adequate consideration”; sell “substantial” property for less 
than “adequate consideration”; or enter into any other transaction that would result in a “substantial 
diversion” of assets to the grantor, their family members, or certain controlled corporations. 
Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 321, 64 Stat. 906, 954-56.  
58. PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 16.
59. Id.
60. Id. The First Installment of the Patman Report notes that the Albert A. List Foundation
was involved in a fight for control of the Endicott Johnson Corporation in 1960. In addition, the 
Fred M. Kirby Foundation was involved in a control struggle over Alleghany Corporation in 1961. 
Id. 
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competition that can occur when an operating business is able to 
function in a tax-advantaged environment.61 
Probably the most significant concern was the ability to run a 
corporation relatively unfettered by the needs of shareholders. This 
concern could not be addressed solely through the regulation of self-
dealing transactions.62 If the governing body of a family foundation that 
owns the stock in the family corporation is largely comprised of 
individuals affiliated with the family corporation personally, there is 
little opportunity for independent oversight. The family foundation, as 
the sole or majority shareholder of the family company, was, as a 
practical matter, unlikely to pursue remedies for a breach of the fiduciary 
duties of its own board or the board of the controlled corporation. The 
general public, as the primary beneficiary of the charitable activities of 
the foundation, could generally only act through the various states’ 
Attorneys General63—again, not something that was likely to occur as a 
practical matter. As a result, the “[p]ossible conflict of interest between 
the duties of the foundation’s directors and trustees and their interest as 
officers, stockholders, and employees of business corporations whose 
stock is controlled by the foundation” would not necessarily be 
addressed by the regulation of self-dealing transactions as a matter of 
either state or federal law.64 
The Patman Report recommended an immediate moratorium on the 
recognition of additional tax-exempt foundations for a number of 
reasons, including the “rapidly increasing concentration of economic 
power in foundations” and the competitive advantages of foundation-
controlled businesses over the small businessman.65 Specifically, the 
Patman Report recommended that “[t]ax-exempt foundations should be 
prohibited from engaging in business directly or indirectly. Foundations 
controlling corporations engaged in business, through the extent of stock 
ownership in those corporations, should themselves be deemed to be 
61. “A foundation-controlled business, with no stockholders to worry about could
conceivably operate at a loss for some time in order to eliminate a competitor. It is suggested that in 
periods of recession destructive competition could result from foundation controlled enterprises 
since making a profit, paying dividends, and maintaining equity credit are of little concern to a 
privately controlled, tax-exempt foundation.” Id. at 15. 
62. Id.
63. At common law, individual members of the general public do not have standing to
enforce the public purpose of a charitable entity. See generally Iris Goodwin, Donor Standing to 
Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs. Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (2005).  
64. PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 16. In the recitation of subjects in need of careful
examination, the Patman Report extensively discusses corporation holdings but never specifically 
mentions the use of partnerships. 
65. Id. at 1.
13
Waterhouse Wilson: Better Late Than Never
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
498 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:485 
engaged in that business.”66 Patman suggested limiting a foundation’s 
holdings to no more than three percent of the stock of a corporation, 
prohibiting a foundation from voting stock, and setting standards for 
foundation behavior in proxy fights.67 
The abuses discussed in the Patman Report occurred almost 
exclusively in the context of the foundation-controlled business 
corporations—there is almost never a discussion of partnerships as 
controlled entities.68 Rather, partnerships were seen as an example of 
“direct” or “joint” ownership by a donor in his individual capacity. This 
lack of concern over the role of partnerships and similar entities is 
demonstrated by the data tables provided in the later installments of the 
Patman Report.69 The Patman Report summarized the information that it 
gathered as it reviewed the 534 foundations it studied.70 While the data is 
broken down to show detailed information about corporate holdings,71 
there is no specific data regarding partnership holdings. 
It is not even clear from the presentation of the schedules as to how 
partnership income or ownership is taken into account.72 Schedule 1 of 
the Patman Report broke down the gross receipts of the 534 foundations 
studied by the type of income. Partnership income might have been 
reported in the “other income” column, which may include partnership 
distributions, although pass-through items from partnership distributions 
of interest, dividends, rents and royalties, or gain and loss from property 
transactions also may be reported in those respective columns.73 
Similarly, Schedule 5 broke down the investments of the 534 
foundations by asset type. Partnerships are not mentioned specifically—
they might have been lumped with “other investments,”74 or the schedule 
could have looked through the partnership entity and reported the 
underlying partnership assets in their appropriate columns on the rest of 
66. Id. at 133.
67. Id.
68. By the author’s personal count, the word “partnership” was used no more than three
times in the First Installment of the Patman Report. See generally id. 
69. See PATMAN REPORT 2, supra note 9; PATMAN REPORT 3, supra note 9.
70. PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at v.
71. By way of example, Schedule 2 of the Patman Report sets forth “data regarding
corporations in which certain foundations failed to report their ownership of 10 percent or more of 
each class of the corporation’s stock,” while Schedule 3 discusses “foundations’ ownership of 10 
percent or more of any class of stock of any corporation.” Schedule 5, which details the asset 
holdings of the foundations in question, specifically breaks out corporate holdings at both book and 
market value. PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 86-113.  
72. See generally id. at 21-37.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 86-113.
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the table. The note to Schedule 5, Column 8 does not even mention 
partnership interests, stating: 
The foundation’s assets consist of a variety of investments other than 
securities. Land, real estate, inventories, equipment, patents, insurance 
policies, works of art, etc. are examples of assets owned by 
foundations, and their market values may be considerably greater than 
the book values indicated by the foundation and used herein.75 
If we assume that partnership interests would have been reported as 
“other investments” on Schedule 5, a quick review of the reported 
numbers may indicate why partnership interests received little to no 
attention in the Patman Report. Of the 534 foundations studied, only 18 
(and generally, only the very largest) had total “other investments” in 
excess of $1,000,000 in book value.76 By contrast, most of the 
foundations had corporate stock over $1,000,000 in book value, and 
almost all had corporate stock with a fair market value of over 
$1,000,000. By the numbers, the source of the problem was clearly with 
the corporate holdings of the foundations studied; partnership 
investments were an afterthought.77 
The Patman Report was published in three installments. The second 
installment, issued in 1963,78 detailed the specific transactions of a 
handful of foundations: the Baird Foundations, the Hessie Smith Noyes 
Foundations, the Lawrence A. Wein Foundation, and the Harry B. 
Helmsley Foundation. Of the multiple transactions described in the 
second installment, only two sets of transactions involved a 
partnership.79 In 1959, Lawrence A. Wien donated participating interests 
in five partnerships to his foundation. The report’s objection to these 
donations does not appear to involve control or investment issues; rather, 
the concern was that Mr. Wien was able to shelter significant amounts of 
75. Id. at 128 n.5.
76. Id. at 86-113. Schedule 5 states that, “[g]enerally, assets other than securities are shown
at book value.” Id. at 107. 
77. One of the few mentions of partnerships comes in the recommendation section of the
Patman Report in the context of the treatment of S Corporations: 
In the case of corporations that are treated like partnerships (Subchapter S, Chapter 1, 
Internal Revenue Code), contributions to foundations should “pass through” to the 
stockholders and be included pro rata as contributions by the stockholders personally. In 
that way, the 20 percent and 30 percent limitations on contributions will be maintained. 
At present, through the mechanics of Subchapter S (Chapter 1, Internal Revenue Code), 
an extra 5 percent of the corporation’s income becomes deductible by the stockholders. 
PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 134. 
78. PATMAN REPORT 2, supra note 9.
79. Id. at 83-88.
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capital gain through the donations.80 Additionally, a partnership that 
owned a hotel and leased it to an operating company, which had been 
organized by and owned in part by Mr. Wein, made a series of donations 
to Mr. Wein’s foundation. It does not appear that the Wein Foundation 
owned any part of the partnership; rather, the implication appears to be 
that Mr. Wein may have avoided receiving certain fees for legal services 
by having the partnership make donations to his foundation instead.81 In 
these few mentions of partnerships, the issue appears to be improper 
benefits accruing to the donor (capital gains avoidance or assignment of 
income) and not with the foundation’s participation in the partnership 
itself. 
3. The 1965 Treasury Report
In addition, the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways 
and Means Committee asked the Department of Treasury to examine 
private foundation tax abuses and to report on its conclusions. On 
February 2, 1965, Treasury forwarded its report and recommendations 
for legislation to both Committees, which was then published by the 
Senate Finance Committee.82 While the 1965 Report built upon many of 
the abuses identified in the Patman hearings,83 Treasury’s study 
encompassed a wider universe of private foundations. According to the 
1965 Report, Treasury “conducted a special canvass of approximately 
1,300 selected foundations,” more than double the amount studied by the 
Patman Report.84 
Like the Patman hearings before it, the 1965 Report highlighted a 
number of areas of private foundation abuse, including “Foundation 
Involvement in Business,”85 “Family Use of Foundations to Control 
Corporate and Other Property,”86 and “Financial Transactions Unrelated 
to Charitable Functions.”87 
80. In each case, the partnership held a purchase money mortgage. They appear to be general
partnerships (although this is not entirely clear). Mr. Wein donated two 50% interests, a 99.09% 
interest, a 20% interest, and a 2.5% interest. Id.   
81. Id. at 81-82.
82. 1965 REPORT, supra note 1.
83. Id. at 2 n.5 (citing PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9; PATMAN REPORT 2, supra note 9;
PATMAN REPORT 3, supra note 9). 
84. Id. at 2.
85. Id. at 7.
86. Id. at 8.
87. Id. at 9. This portion of the discussion recommends a prohibition on borrowing, a
limitation on foundation investments similar to the approved list approach used for private trusts at 
the time, and a prohibition on “trading activities and speculative practices.” Id. This discussion 
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The discussion entitled “Foundation Involvement in Business” 
described Treasury’s recommendations that would eventually form the 
structure of Code Section 4943. Among the problems identified as 
resulting from foundation involvement in business enterprises were 
competition with for-profit enterprises, “opportunities and temptations 
for subtle and varied forms of self-dealing” that would be beyond the 
reach of what would become Code Section 4941,88 and a diversion of 
management attention from charitable activities to commercial 
enterprises.89 As a result, the 1965 Report proposed prohibiting 
foundation ownership “either directly or through stock holdings, 20 
percent or more” of an unrelated business.90 
The 1965 Report catalogued the competitive advantages to a 
business arising out of the involvement of a related private foundation. 
There is, of course, the fact that the foundation is an income-tax-exempt 
entity. Beyond that, the 1965 Report noted that a foundation could 
essentially accumulate income within a controlled corporation.91 Even 
though Treasury simultaneously proposed a mandatory minimum 
distribution rule for foundation, the 1965 Report noted that those 
distributions would apply to the foundation’s income and not to the 
undistributed income of the controlled corporation.92 A decision to 
accumulate income within the business for its own capital needs (or 
simply so it does need to be distributed) runs counter to the need to fund 
charity currently. Similarly, a foundation, as shareholder, may be willing 
to continue to fund or to tolerate a business that is producing losses 
longer than for-profit shareholders or a third party lender might be 
willing to consider, at the ultimate expense of charity.93 
While the 1965 Report highlighted a number of abuses of business 
assets akin to subtle acts of self-dealing that might not be captured by 
what would become Code Section 4941, Treasury discussed at length 
another concern with foundation ownership of operating business 
interests. In the 1965 Report, Treasury set forth its rationale for why 
would form the basis for current Code Section 4944 regarding jeopardizing investments. 
88. Id. at 34 (“However broadly drawn the restrictions upon self-dealing may be, many of the
conflicts of interest arising in this area are likely to be sufficiently obscure or sufficiently beyond 
the realms of reasonable definition to escape the practical impact of the limitations.”). 
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id. It is unclear whether this 20% included holdings by affiliated persons at the date of
publishing—it may not. Id. 
91. The 1965 Report does not note that the accumulated earnings tax (currently found in
Code Sections 531-537), would have worked to limit accumulations within a C Corporation to some 
degree. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 531-537 (1954). 
92. 1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 34.
93. Id. at 35.
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private foundations should continue to be subsidized through tax-
exemption and should not be subject to term limits.94 Treasury believed 
that “the private foundation is uniquely qualified to provide a basis for 
individual experimentation and the exercise of creative imagination.”95 
The charitable activities of a private foundation are not limited in scope; 
it can fund whatever charitable projects may capture the interest of the 
foundation’s governing body. A private foundation is “easily 
established” and “inherently flexible.”96 As such, it is particularly suited 
“for use by those who are concerned with, and devoted to the 
development of, new areas of social improvement.”97 With the support 
of a private foundation, “[n]ew ventures can be assisted, new areas 
explored, new concepts developed, new causes advanced.”98 
Underlying this rationale for the preferential treatment of private 
foundation is the assumption that the foundation’s governing body is 
active and involved in setting and pursuing the foundation’s charitable 
mission. If, instead, the governing body is consumed by managing the 
foundation’s business holdings, then less time will be spent on the 
innovative programming that is the unique province of the private 
foundation.99 “Business may become the end of the organization; 
charity, an insufficiently considered and mechanically accomplished 
afterthought.”100 
Treasury’s proposal to address the issue of foundation entanglement 
in commercial affairs at the expense of attention to charitable endeavors 
involved “an absolute limit on the involvement of private foundations in 
active business.”101 The proposal would prevent foundations from 
owning 20% or more of the combined voting power or the total equity of 
a corporation.102 Similarly, the 20% prohibition would apply to 
ownership “by a foundation, either directly or through a partnership, of a 
20-percent or larger interest in the capital or profits of such a 
business.”103 The 1965 Report’s proposal, however, did not attribute to 
94. Id. at 31.
95. Id. at 35.
96. Id.
97. Id.; see also id. at 12-13 (private foundations “enrich and strengthen the pluralism of our
social order” and “provided impetus for change within the structure of American philanthropy”). 
98. Id. at 13.
99. See id. at 35 (“[t]he charitable pursuits that constitute the real reason for [a private
foundation’s] existence may be submerged by the pressures and demand of the commercial 
enterprise”). 
100.  Id.  
101.  Id. at 36. 
102.  Id. 
103.  Id. 
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the foundation the ownership of interests held by donors, foundation 
managers, or their family members; rather, only interests held for the 
benefit of the foundation through trusts or other corporations would be 
attributed up to the foundation.104 
Interestingly, the retention of family control over business property 
was discussed separately from the issue of foundation involvement in 
commercial activities. The 1965 Report, after discussing the fact that 
donors often retain control of corporate holdings contributed to a private 
foundation, noted that “[s]imilar problems arise when a donor 
contributes an interest in an unincorporated business or an undivided 
interest in property, in which he or related parties continue to have 
substantial rights.”105 Treasury expressed the concern that the private 
interests of the other equity holders of the business property would 
trump the interests of charity.106 Treasury’s solution at the time was to 
propose that, if a donor and related parties retained control over 
contributed assets, the gift of the business was not yet complete and the 
charitable tax deductions associated with that contribution would be 
delayed.107 For these purposes, control would be presumed if the donor 
and related party owned 20% of the voting interest in a corporation or a 
20% interest in an unincorporated business or other property.108 These 
provisions were not enacted in 1969 and have not been enacted to this 
day. Passive investing activities were excluded from the definition of 
“business,” as these activities would not have caused the diversion of 
attention away from charitable projects in the same manner as an active 
business might.109 
The 1965 Report also expressed significant concern over the 
possibility that family members may have conflicting fiduciary duties to 
the family company and the private foundation (not to mention personal 
interest), which may be too subtle to be captured by the self-dealing 
rules of Section 4941.110 Examples given in the 1965 Report include 
hiring decisions in favor of friends and family, decisions regarding 
 104.  Id. As discussed infra Part III.B, when Code Section 4943 was eventually passed, it also 
attributed the holdings of donors, foundation managers, and their family members, as well as other 
related parties, to the foundation for purposes of calculating the 20% permitted holdings rule. 26 
U.S.C. § 4946(a) (2012). 
105.  1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 8. 
106.  Id. 
107.  See id. at 41-45. 
108.  Id. at 42. 
109.  Id. at 36-37. 
110.  See id. at 40-41 (“Similarly, rules concrete enough to possess real efficacy in the 
prohibition of specific self-dealing practices cannot cope successfully and decisively with the subtle 
and continuing conflicts of interest which arise in the family stock situation.”). 
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accumulation of earnings and dividend policies, or liquidation of the 
foundation’s interest in the business during difficult periods of time.111 
With regard to unincorporated interests, the Report states: 
Problems of the same nature arise where the donor contributes to a 
private foundation an interest in an unincorporated business, or an 
undivided interest in property, in which he or those related to him 
retain substantial rights. Current tax deductions have been claimed, for 
example, for contributions of rights in the air space over the donor’s, 
water rights adjacent to a private beach which the donor owns, or 
fractional interests in vacant land which the donor controls. Here 
again, because of the donor’s close continuing connection with the 
property, it is hardly realistic to expect the foundation to make 
independent decisions about its use and disposition of the property.112 
This assumes that the donor is a foundation manager and, therefore, 
owes fiduciary duties to both the foundation and the business entity 
owned by the foundation. In each case, it requires such individual to be 
in a position to control the activities of the business. 
The emphasis on corporate abuses highlighted in the Patman 
hearings continued in the 1965 Report. In the section highlighting self-
dealing abuses, Treasury gave 12 examples of problematic 
transactions113—ten of the 12 examples explicitly involve corporate 
holdings.114 The other two examples involve real estate that may have 
been owned directly by the foundation115—in neither case is ownership 
through a partnership specifically mentioned, although it is possible.116 
As with the Patman Report, Treasury compiled statistics regarding 
the business holdings of the private foundations it reviewed. Of the 
approximately 1,300 foundations studied, approximately 180 reported 
ownership of 10% or more of one class of stock of a corporation.117 Of 
these, 109 owned 20% or more of a corporation and 40% held a 100% 
111.  Id. 
112.  Id. at 41. Again, the 1965 Report does not specifically mention partnerships.  
113.  Id at 18-20. 
114.  Id. 
115.  Id. at 19-20. The two real estate examples are example 7 (real estate contributed to a 
foundation and leased back to the donor) and example 8 (foundation uses contributions to construct 
buildings leased back to the donors’ retail businesses). 
 116.  Id. Similarly, in the section discussing foundation involvement in business, Treasury 
provided six initial examples of significant business holdings by foundations—four of these 
addressed multiple corporate holdings, one was unclear, and the last involved the sale and lease 
back of the operating assets of 18 different businesses. Again, at no time does the 1965 Report 
indicate that any of these are owned by partnerships explicitly. Id at 30-31. 
117.  Id. at 31. 
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interest.118 The 1965 Report further described its findings regarding 
foundation holdings in multiple corporations. It ended its description of 
its findings with the statement, “[i]n other cases, of course, foundations 
own and operate businesses directly,” with no further comment.119 All 
three examples of abuse in this area cited by the 1965 Report involved 
corporate holdings.120 
In summary, Treasury stated that its 
recommendations seek not only to end diversions, distractions, and 
abuses, but to stimulate and foster the active pursuit of charitable ends 
which the tax laws seek to encourage. Any restraints which the 
proposal may impose on the flow of funds to private foundation will be 
far outweighed by the benefits which will accrue to charity from the 
removal of abuses and from the elimination of the shadow which the 
existence of abuse now casts upon the private foundation area.121 
Thus, Code Section 4943 was originally designed not only to prevent 
subtle acts of self-dealing and abuse but also to insure that the 
foundation was appropriately focused on the charitable endeavors that 
justified its tax-exempt status. As with the Patman Report, however, the 
1965 Report focused primarily on abuses involving corporate ownership 
and rarely discussed foundation ownership of affiliated partnerships. 
4. Passage in 1969
The 1965 Report did not result in immediate legislation. The 
private foundation reform discussion continued through the late 1960s, 
culminating in the passage of the private foundation excise taxes 
(specifically including the excess business holdings tax) in 1969.122 
In 1969, Treasury forwarded to Congress a comprehensive tax 
reform package, which included proposals for the private foundation 
excise taxes.123 Specifically referencing the 1965 Report,124 Treasury 
stated that a minority of private foundations “are being operated so as to 
118.  Id. 
 119. Id.; see also id. at 30 ([o]rdinarily, the involvement takes the form of ownership of a 
controlling interest in one or more corporations that operate businesses; occasionally, a foundation 
owns and operates a business directly”). 
120.  Id. at 39. 
121.  Id. at 10 (emphasis added). 
122.  Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. 
123.  U.S. TREAS. DEPT., J. PUB. H. COMM. OF WAYS AND MEANS AND S. COMM. ON FIN., 
91ST CONG., 1 TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS (Comm. Print 1969). Note the Tax Reform 
Proposal from Treasury appeared in multiple separate parts, which are referred to collectively herein 
as the “Tax Reform Proposal.” 
124.  Id. at 26. 
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bring private advantage to certain individuals, to delay passing on 
directly benefits to charity for extended periods of time, and to involve 
the foundation too greatly in the ownership and management of 
commercial enterprises.”125 The Tax Reform Proposal cites involvement 
in commercial enterprises generally as the issue to be addressed and not 
simply involvement with businesses that are affiliated with the 
foundation and its foundation managers.126 Treasury’s Tax Reform 
Proposal further states that the private foundation excise taxes were 
designed, in part, “to divorce the philanthropic aspects of foundations 
from their control and management of business.”127 
The portion of the Tax Reform Proposal that explains the private 
foundation excise taxes begins as follows: 
Private philanthropy plays a special and vital role in our society. 
Beyond providing financial aid to areas which government cannot or 
should not advance (such as religion), private philanthropic 
organizations are uniquely qualified to initiate thought and action, 
experiment with new and untried ventures, dissent from prevailing 
attitudes, and act quickly and flexibly. 
Private foundations have an important part in this work. . . . [T]hey 
enable individuals or small groups to establish new charitable 
endeavors and to express their own bents, concerns, and experience. In 
doing so, they enrich the pluralism of our social order.128 
While the majority of private foundations were believed to be carrying 
out these charitable functions, a small number of foundations were 
operated “to bring private advantage to certain individuals” and “to 
cause competitive disadvantage between businesses operated by 
foundations and those operated by private individuals.”129 As with the 
Patman hearings and the 1965 Report before it, the Tax Reform Proposal 
identified four primary issues to be addressed: (1) competitive 
disadvantage, (2) subtle forms of self-dealing, (3) deferral of benefits to 
charity through accumulations in controlled corporations, and (4) 
preoccupation by the foundation with business affairs.130 
The technical explanation of the provision that would become 
125.  Id. 
126.  Id. 
127.  Id. at 41. 
128.  U.S. TREAS. DEPT., J. PUBLICATION H. COMM. OF WAYS AND MEANS AND S. COMM. ON 
FIN., 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., 3 TAX REFORM STUD. AND PROPOSALS 295 (Comm. Print 1969). 
129.  Id. at 295. 
130.  Id. at 296. 
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Section 4943 is entitled “Limitation on Involvement in Business.”131 The 
proposal would have prohibited a foundation from owning, directly or 
indirectly, 20% or more of the combined voting power or 20% or more 
of the equity of a corporation conducting an unrelated trade or 
business.132 This appears to be the first time that the issue of voting 
control versus economic interest is identified in the context of the 
structure of Section 4943. 
With regard to partnerships, the Tax Reform Proposal does provide 
that “the direct or indirect ownership of a 20-percent or larger interest in 
the capital or profits of an unincorporated business not substantially 
related to the exempt functions of the owner foundation would also be 
prohibited.”133 Other than this particular phrase, there is no separate 
discussion of partnerships.134 
5. Summary of Historical Materials
In summary, two things are clear from a review of the legislative 
materials that preceded the enactment of Section 4943. First, Treasury 
and Congress were concerned about private foundation involvement in 
business not only because of the potential for improper benefits to 
private individuals but also due to the potential for a private foundation 
to focus its attention on its operating business holdings at the expense of 
its charitable mission. These two concerns underscore Congress’ 
attempts to limit the ability of foundations to be involved in corporate 
activities through the ownership of voting stock. Second, almost all of 
the abuses highlighted in the legislative materials involved operating 
businesses held in corporate form—which, given the economic and tax 
structure in place at the time, made perfect sense. The almost non-
existent discussion of business holdings in unincorporated enterprises in 
the legislative history, combined with the skeletal statutory provisions 
governing unincorporated enterprises, leads one to believe that the 
provisions that would address unincorporated entities—eventually 
enacted as Code Section 4943(c)(3)—were practically an afterthought. 
131.  Id. at 301. 
132.  Id. 
133.  Id. at 301-02. The Tax Reform Proposal also clarifies that the 20% limitation would 
apply to indirect as well as direct ownership, giving an example that would attribute stock held in 
trust to the foundation to the extent of its beneficial interest in the trust. Id. 
 134.  As a further indication that Treasury was not focused on the issue of partnerships, the 
draft provisions that would define “disqualified person” under Code Section 4946 did not address 
partnerships. The proposed rules specifically addressed corporations, trusts (including grantor 
trusts), and estates but not partnerships or other unincorporated entities. Id. at 299. 
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B. The Tax Code and LLCs 
The taxation of a business entity under the Internal Revenue Code 
is dictated by its classification as a partnership or an association under 
Code Section 7701.135 Section 7701(a)(2) defines a partnership to 
include a joint venture or “other unincorporated organization, through or 
by means of which any business, financial operation or venture is carried 
on, and which is not, within the meaning of this title, a trust or estate or a 
corporation . . . .”136 At the same time, Section 7701(a)(3) defines a 
corporation to include an association.137 The question of whether an 
entity is a corporation or partnership seemed easy enough (usually) if the 
entity was, in fact, a corporation or a partnership under state law. The 
question was not so clear with the introduction of LLC statutes, which 
by definition were neither corporations nor partnerships. 
When Wyoming introduced the first LLC statute in 1977,138 the 
Code classified business entities as either associations or partnerships 
based on a multi-factor test.139 The state law form of entity was not 
determinative for federal tax purposes,140 although typically a state law 
corporation would be an association and a general partnership formed 
under the Uniform Partnership Act would be an unincorporated 
organization.141 
Prior to 1998, in the event of ambiguity, the regulations under 
Section 7701 looked to see whether an entity had more of the 
characteristics of a corporation or of a partnership when assigning 
federal income tax classification. These factors were derived from a 
 135.  26 U.S.C. § 7701 (2012). Compare Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(b) (1977) (at the time LLCs 
come in) (“The Internal Revenue Code prescribes certain categories, or classes, into which various 
organizations fall for purposes of taxation. These categories, or classes, include associations (which 
are taxable as corporations), partnerships, and trusts.”) with Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a) (as 
amended in 2014) (“The Internal Revenue Code prescribes the classification of various 
organizations for federal tax purposes. Whether an organization is an entity separate from its owners 
for federal tax purposes is a matter of federal tax law and does not depend on whether the 
organization is recognized as an entity under local law.”). 
136.  26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(2). 
 137.  Id. § 7701(a)(3). See also Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (2013) (“The term partnership 
means a business entity that is not a corporation under paragraph (b) of this section and that has at 
least two members.”). 
138. See Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 577 
(codified as amended at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-103 (repealed 2010)). 
 139.  An entity could also have been a trust as defined under Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4, 
although typically these are not business entities. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(b) (1977). See also 
Susan Pace Hamill, The Story of LLCs: Combining the Best Features of a Flawed Business Tax 
Structure, in BUS. TAX STORIES 295 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005). 
140.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1977). 
141.  UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 5 (2001). 
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series of cases, most notably the United States v. Kintner case142—as a 
result, the entity classification regulations under Section 7701 in 
existence prior to 1998 came to be known as the Kintner regulations. 
The Kintner regulations analyzed business entities for classification 
based on the following six characteristics: 
1. Associates;
2. Objective to carry on a business and divide gains;
3. Continuity of life;
4. Centralized management;
5. Limited liability for entity debts; and
6. Free transferability of interests.143
As both corporations and partnerships had, by definition, associates and 
an objective to carry on a business and divide the profits, these first two 
factors were generally not determinative for purposes of entity 
classification.144 Rather, the last four factors—continuity of life, 
centralized management, limited liability, and transferability—were the 
keys to entity classification and were given equal weight.145 If an entity 
had more “corporate” characteristics than “partnership” characteristics, 
then it would be deemed to be a corporation for tax purposes; otherwise, 
it would be a partnership.146 
The typical state law corporation has continuity of life of its own 
accord, while a general partnership technically dissolves on the 
withdrawal of a shareholder, among other things.147 A corporation has 
exclusive centralized management through its board of directors,148 
while all general partners participate in management due to the agency 
relationship contemplated in the Uniform Partnership Act.149 Of course, 
shareholders are insulated from liability for corporate debts while 
 142.  United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954) (discussing a Montana medical 
practice formed as a partnership that liquidated and reformed as an unincorporated association in an 
attempt to obtain corporate tax classification). 
143.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1977). 
 144.  Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(2); see also JAMES S. EUSTICE & THOMAS BRANTLEY, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, ¶ 2.04 (Westlaw 2015).  
145.  Larson v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 159, 172-84 (1976), acq. 1979-1 C.B. 1. 
146.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1977). 
147.  Id. § 301.7701-2(b)(1). 
148.  Id. § 301.7701-2(c). 
149.  Id. § 301.7701-2(c)(4). 
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general partners are personally liable for the debts of the partnership.150 
Finally, corporate shareholders can typically trade their shares freely 
absent a shareholder agreement to the contrary, while partnership 
interests are typically not transferrable without the consent of the non-
transferring partners.151 
This facts and circumstances test of the Kintner regulations was an 
administrative nightmare for the IRS and a source of both ambiguity and 
opportunity for taxpayers. A creative lawyer could attempt to draft a 
partnership agreement that had “corporate” characteristics.152 Even with 
creative drafting, an entity was always susceptible to entity classification 
review by the IRS—assuming, of course, the IRS had the resources to 
find and audit, on a case-by-case basis, all of the taxpayers utilizing 
creative drafting as a basis for entity classification. 
In the face of this uncertainty, the Wyoming LLC was a statutory 
attempt to create the mythical hybrid entity that had corporate liability 
protection and federal partnership taxation without forcing lawyers to 
opt into the preferred tax classification through creative drafting.153 
Unfortunately, it took about a decade before the IRS confirmed that a 
Wyoming LLC governed by the default statutory rules would be taxed as 
a partnership. In the interim, Treasury unsuccessfully attempted to make 
limited liability the most important factor in the classification, thus 
making LLCs corporations by default.154 Finally, in Revenue Ruling 88-
76, the IRS ruled that a Wyoming LLC could qualify as a partnership for 
federal tax purposes under Section 7701.155 
In the interim, the uncertainty regarding the appropriate tax 
classification of LLCs chilled any movement to enact LLC legislation 
 150.  Id. § 301.7701-2(d). Because the general partner in a limited partnership still has 
unlimited liability for partnership obligations, limited liability did not exist for a limited partnership 
unless the general partner had no substantial assets that could be reached by creditors (i.e., it is an 
undercapitalized “dummy” acting as an agent of the limited partners.) Id. § 301.7701-2(d)(2). 
151.  Id. § 301.7701-2(e). 
 152.  Thomas M. Hayes, Checkmate, the Treasury Finally Surrenders: The Check-the-Box 
Treasury Regulations and Their Effect on Entity Classification, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1147, 
1156 (1997). 
153.  Hamill, supra note 139, at 296-97.  
154.  See 45 Fed. Reg. 75, 710 (Nov. 17, 1980) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301), repealed by 
Announcement 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 30; see also Carter G. Bishop & Robert R. Keatinge, An 
Introduction, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455, 455 (2009); Hamill, supra note 139, at 296. 
 155.  Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988 C.B. 360. The ruling held that the LLC had the corporate 
characteristic of a limited liability, but the terms of the Wyoming act ensured that the organization 
did not have free transferability or continuity of life. The organization in the ruling was a manager-
managed LLC and therefore deemed to have the corporate characteristic of centralized management. 
Because the organization did not have a preponderance of corporate characteristics, it was taxed as a 
partnership. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1983)).  
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nationwide. Between the passage in Wyoming in 1997 and Revenue 
Ruling 88-76, only Florida passed an LLC statute in 1982.156 By 1998, 
there were only 26 active Wyoming LLCs.157 With the issuance of 
Revenue Ruling 88-76, however, the floodgates opened. In 1991, 
Delaware adopted its LLC statute; by the end of 1996, all 51 U.S. 
jurisdictions had LLC enabling legislation.158 
Wyoming drafted its LLC statute to provide that any LLC formed 
under the laws of that state would have more partnership characteristics 
than corporate characteristics under the Kintner test, as the statutory 
rules for lack of transferability and continuity of life would always 
apply.159 In Florida and other states that based their legislation on the 
Wyoming model, LLCs were also classified as partnerships, which was 
confirmed by the IRS in a series of formulaic revenue rulings addressed 
to each state statute.160 
On the other hand, some state statutes gave the LLC the flexibility 
to change the default rules that addressed the Kintner criteria. An LLC 
formed in one of these flexible states could essentially choose corporate 
or partnership status with careful drafting of its provisions regarding 
transferability and continuity of life.161 As a result, it was possible in 
these states to form LLCs that, “for non-tax purposes . . . in all 
meaningful respects . . . [were] virtually indistinguishable from closely 
held corporations, even though they could be structured to be taxed as 
partnerships.”162 The IRS approved the classification of LLCs structure 
in flexible jurisdictions as partnerships at the end of 1994.163 
This entity classification system structure ultimately proved 
unworkable. Each LLC classification determination was essentially a 
facts-and-circumstances analysis. With the proliferation of LLC enabling 
statutes, and therefore the proliferation of LLCs, after Revenue Rulings 
88-76 and 95-10, the Kintner regulations were all but dead. 
 156.  Fla. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act, 1982 Fla. Laws 82-177; see also Bishop & Keatinge, supra note 
154, at 455; Hamill supra note 139, at 296.  
157.  RIBSTEIN, LIPSHAW, MILLER & FERSHEE, supra note 27, at 57. 
158.  Id. at 58; Hamill supra note 139, at 297. 
159.  RIBSTEIN, LIPSHAW, MILLER & FERSHEE, supra note 27, at 58; Hamill, supra note 139, at 
297. 
 160.  Thomas Earl Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative 
Primer (Part One), 37 S.D. LAW. REV. 44, 45 n.7-8, 49 n.35, 50 (1992); Thomas Earl Geu, 
Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer (Part Two), 37 S.D. 
LAW. REV. 467, 499 (1992).  
161.  Hamill, supra note 139, at 301. 
 162.  PAUL R. MCDANIEL, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & DANIEL L. SIMMONS, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND S CORPORATIONS 12 (5th ed. 2012).  
163.  See Rev. Rul. 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 168; Hamill, supra note 139, at 302. 
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Ultimately, Treasury addressed the uncertainty caused by the 
Kintner regime through the implementation of the “check-the-box” 
regulations, which became effective as of January 1, 1997.164 In 
summary, the check-the-box regulations set up default rules that initially 
classify an organization as either a corporation or a partnership. Some 
entities are allowed to elect a different classification then that assigned 
to them by default by checking the appropriate box on Form 8832—thus, 
the “check-the-box rules.” 
If a business entity is not a trust or a disregarded entity,165 then “a 
business entity with two or more members is classified for federal tax 
purposes as either a corporation or a partnership.”166 A business entity 
that is a corporation under state law, or that is an “association” as 
defined in Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-3, will be treated as a 
corporation for federal tax purposes.167 On the other hand, a partnership 
is a business entity that is not a corporation and has at least two 
members.168 
An eligible entity that is not deemed to be a trust or a corporation 
may “elect its classification for federal tax purposes.”169 An 
unincorporated entity, such as an LLC, may elect to be treated as an 
association (and therefore, a corporation under Section 7701(a)(3)). If it 
does not elect association treatment, then a domestic unincorporated 
entity with two or more members is automatically deemed to be a 
partnership for federal tax purposes.170 
Under these regulations, the Code does not specifically recognize 
LLCs. Rather, a domestic LLC is treated as an unincorporated entity. 
Under the check-the-box regulations, an LLC is deemed to be a 
partnership for federal tax purposes by default and need do nothing 
164.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 – § 301.7701-3 (as amended by T.D. 8697, 1997). 
 165.  Disregarded entities include single member LLCs, which are treated essentially as a sole 
proprietorship of the single member. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2) (as amended in 2014). 
166.  Id. § 301.7701-2(a). 
167.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2014). In addition, joint stock companies, 
insurance companies, state chartered banks that hold FDIC insured deposits, business entities owned 
by the government, and certain listed foreign entities are deemed to be corporations for federal tax 
purposes. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b). 
168.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1). 
 169.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a). The election is made by selecting association treatment on 
Form 8832 (thus, “check the box”) and filing the form with the Internal Revenue Service. Id.  
170.  Id. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(i). In contrast, a foreign unincorporated entity will be treated as an 
association by default if all of the members of the entity have limited liability. Id. § 301.7701-
3(b)(2)(i)(B). A member of a foreign unincorporated entity is treated as having limited liability if 
“the member has no personal liability for the debts of or claims against the entity solely by reason of 
being a member” under the law of the country of organization. Id. § 301.7701-3(b)(2)(ii). 
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further if that classification is acceptable. However, an LLC may 
affirmatively “check the box” and elect to be treated as an association, 
and therefore a corporation, for federal tax purposes. 
As a result, an LLC is the master of its own tax destiny. As the 
check-the-box election is purely mechanical, the LLC does not need to 
draft its way into corporate or partnership status, as it needed to do prior 
to 1997. Rather, the LLC can take full advantage of the flexibility 
afforded to it under state law for management, liability, and 
transferability purposes, while still being able to select between 
partnership or corporate tax classification. 
The election to be treated as a corporation or a partnership is 
effective for “federal tax purposes.”171 There is no explicit statement in 
the Regulations that check-the-box applies for purposes of the private 
foundation excise taxes found in Chapter 42, including Section 4943. 
III. CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME
A. Private Foundations, Defined 
Code Section 501(c)(3) exempts from federal income taxation 
entities that are organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
scientific, educational, literary, charitable, and other tax-exempt 
purposes.172 Organizations described in Code Section 501(c)(3) are 
further subdivided into two categories: private foundations and public 
charities.173 A Section 501(c)(3) organization is deemed to be a private 
foundation unless it proves that it is entitled to public charity status.174 
There are, essentially, three ways for a Section 501(c)(3) organization to 
achieve public charity status: 
1. Existing for a purpose that is deemed to be automatically worthy
of public charity status. This category includes hospitals, schools,
and churches175 as well as organizations that perform testing for
public safety,176
2. Meeting one of two alternative mathematical tests, both of which
are designed to measure the diversity of a charity’s financial
 171.  There are specific exceptions from the wholly owned entity rules for certain excise taxes 
(not Chapter 42) and for employment taxes. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(v); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 
301.7701-2T (as amended 2014). 
172.  26 U.S.C. § 501(a) & (c)(3) (2012). 
173.  26 U.S.C. § 509(a) (2012). 
174.  Id. 
175.  Id. § 509(a)(1) (via 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(v) (2012)). 
176.  Id. § 509(a)(4). 
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support as a proxy for being responsive to the general public,177 or 
3. Qualifying as a “supporting organization”—that is, an
organization that was created for the purpose of benefitting one or
more other public charities.178
If an organization does not fall into one of these categories, it is treated 
as a private foundation. The generic private foundation with which most 
people may be familiar holds a substantial endowment of investment 
assets that it obtained from a single person, family, or business, the 
income from which is used to make grants to other charities.179 
The consequences of being characterized as a private foundation 
rather than a public charity can be substantial.180 One of the most serious 
of these consequences is that private foundations are subject to the 
Chapter 42 private foundation excise tax regime, including Code Section 
4943.181 As currently enacted, Code Section 4943 imposes an excise tax 
on the “excess business holdings” of any private foundation in a 
“business enterprise.”182 The initial tax, on the foundation itself, equals 
10% of the excess business holding.183 However, if the excess holding is 
not corrected, the IRS may impose an additional excise tax of 200% of 
the excess holding.184 Given these stakes, it is critical for a private 
foundation to understand what constitutes an “excess business holding” 
and a “business enterprise.” If either one of these elements is missing, 
177.  Id. § 509(a)(1) (via 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) and 26 U.S.C. § 509(a)(2)). 
178.  Id. § 509(a)(3) and § 509(f). 
179.  According to the Council on Foundations, in 2011 there were 73,764 private foundations 
with more than $604 billion in assets and more than $45 billion in annual giving. Private 
Foundations, COUNCIL ON FOUNDS., http://www.cof.org/foundation-type/private-foundations (last 
visited March 29, 2015). By way of example, the largest private foundation in the United States is 
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, with an endowment in excess of $37 billion according to its 
2012 annual report. BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2012), 
available at  http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/Resources-and-Media/Annual-Reports.  
 180.  Classification as a private foundation may also have a negative impact on a donor’s 
charitable income tax deduction under Section 170. Very generally, a donor’s income tax deduction 
is subject to a number of limitations, including an annual limitation in allowable deduction based on 
the donor’s modified adjusted gross income and a decrease in the amount of the charitable 
deduction for appreciated property. For gifts to a private foundation, a donor’s deduction may be 
limited to 20% of the donor’s adjusted gross income (as opposed to 50% or 30% for gifts to or for 
the use of a public charity), and the donor’s deduction may be limited to basis of certain types of 
appreciated property (as opposed to fair market value reduced by short term capital gain for gifts of 
appreciated property to a public charity.) See generally 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(D) & (e).  
181.  26 U.S.C. § 4943 (2012). 
182.  Id. § 4943(a)(1). 
183.  Id. When originally passed in 1969, the rate was 5%; it was increased to 10% in 2006 as 
part of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, §101(b), 120 Stat. 780. 
184.  26 U.S.C. § 4943(b). 
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then the foundation is not liable for the Section 4943 excise tax. 
If a business entity is not a “business enterprise,” then the excess 
business holding rules do not apply to the private foundation’s 
ownership of that entity.185 The term “business enterprise” is defined in 
the negative, specifically excluding functionally related businesses (as 
defined in Code Section 4942(j)(4))186 and any trade or business of 
which 95% of the income is passive.187 As a result, a business enterprise 
generally means an unrelated, active trade or business, regardless of 
choice of state law entity. 
The term “excess business holding” is defined with reference to the 
concept of a “permitted holding.” A permitted holding is the amount of 
an interest in a business enterprise that a private foundation may own 
without incurring the excise tax. By definition, then, an “excess business 
holding” is the amount of ownership in a business enterprise that 
exceeds permitted holdings.188 The amount of a foundation’s permitted 
holdings depends upon two factors: the type of business enterprise and 
the holdings of certain individuals affiliated with the private 
foundation.189 As a general rule, the foundation must aggregate its 
holdings in a business enterprise with the holdings of certain affiliated 
individuals and entities, known as “disqualified person,” in order to 
calculate its permitted holdings.190 This prevents the foundation or its 
related parties from exerting control over the business enterprise through 
collective or indirect action. 
From there, the definition of permitted holdings historically 
185.  Id. § 4943(d)(3). 
 186.  A functionally related business is either (1) a trade or business that is not unrelated within 
the meaning of Code Section 513 or (2) “an activity which is carried on within a larger aggregate of 
similar activities . . . which is related . . . to the exempt purposes of the organization.” 26 U.S.C. § 
4942(j)(4) (2012). 
187.  For these purposes, passive income is defined with reference to the unrelated business 
income tax sections of 26 U.S.C. § 512(b)(1), (2), (3), and (5) (2012), as well as the income from 
the sales of good that are not manufactured. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200517031 (Apr. 29, 2005) 
(no excess business holding in an LLC that only collected rents from the lease of land because the 
LLC was not a “business enterprise” within the meaning of Section 4943(d)(3)). 
188.  26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(1). 
189.  Id. § 4943(c)(2). 
 190.  The term “disqualified persons” is defined in Section 4946(a)(1) as (1) substantial 
contributors, (2) foundation managers, (3) owners of 20% interests in certain business entities that 
are substantial contributors, (4) members of the family of any of the preceding categories, (5) a 
corporation, partnership, trust or estate in which the preceding categories of persons have a 35% 
beneficial interest, (6) certain governmental officials, and, (7) for purposes of Code Section 4943 
only, certain affiliated private foundations. For purposes of ownership in a partnership under the 
20% and 35% interest tests, Section 4946 looks to the profits interest in the partnership only. 26 
U.S.C. § 4946 (2012). 
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depended upon the type of state law entity in which the business 
enterprise is formed. Consistent with the business entity dichotomy in 
the Code at the time of passage in 1969, Code Section 4943 
contemplates two types of business entities: corporations and non-
corporations. 
B. Permitted Holdings in a Corporation 
The statutory provisions determining a private foundation’s 
permitted holdings in a corporation, found in Code Section 4943(c)(2), 
are fairly detailed. As a general rule, a private foundation may have 
permitted holdings in an incorporated business enterprise191 equal to 
20% of the voting stock of the corporation, reduced by the percentage 
ownership of all disqualified persons.192 For example, if a corporation 
has issued and authorized 100 shares of only one class of voting stock, 
then the foundation and all its disqualified persons, collectively, may 
own only 20 shares of the corporation. If the foundation’s disqualified 
persons already own 20 shares, the foundation would be allowed no 
permitted holdings in the corporation unless an exception applied (as 
discussed below). 
There are a few exceptions to this general rule for corporations. 
First, a private foundation may own up to 2% of the voting stock and not 
more than 2% by value of all the outstanding shares of stock (voting and 
non-voting), even if 20% or more of the voting stock is held by 
disqualified persons.193 Therefore, in the example above, even if the 
foundation’s disqualified persons owned more than 20 shares of the 
stock of the corporation collectively, the foundation would still be 
allowed to own two shares of voting stock as permitted holdings. 
Additionally, a private foundation and its disqualified persons may 
own up to 35% of the voting stock of the corporation if the foundation 
can establish, to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury, that 
effective control of the corporation rests with one or more individuals 
who are not disqualified persons.194 For these purposes, the term 
“effective control” means “the possession, directly or indirectly, of the 
 191.  The regulations provide that the term “incorporated business enterprise” specifically 
includes a real estate investment trust defined in 26 U.S.C. § 856 (2012). Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-
3(b)(1) (as amended in 2009). 
192.  26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(2)(A). 
 193.  Id. § 4943(c)(2)(C). For purposes of this de minimis rule, the holdings of various related 
private foundations are aggregated, so as to prevent a family from setting up multiple foundations 
and giving 2% of a business entity to each of them. Id.  
194.  Id. § 4943(c)(2)(B). 
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power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of 
the business enterprise, whether through the ownership of voting stock” 
or otherwise, such as voting trusts or contractual arrangements.195 This 
typically occurs in the context of publicly traded companies where a 
family continues to retain a substantial block of shares in the company 
after a public offering. 
Finally, a special rule applies if a private foundation owns shares in 
a corporation that has both voting and non-voting stock. Under Code 
Section 4943(c)(2)(A), if a private foundation and all of its disqualified 
persons do not own more than 20% (or 35%, if applicable) of the voting 
stock of a corporation, then the foundation may own an unlimited 
amount of non-voting stock.196 In this manner, a family can give a 
significant amount of the business’s value to a private foundation, so 
long as the control of the business remains elsewhere. This exception 
makes sense in the context of the legislative history’s focus on the value 
of business control to a family and the potential for diversion from 
charitable purposes by attention to business matters. Traditional non-
voting stock poses neither of these issues. 
The concept of what constitutes “voting stock” becomes a key 
inquiry in determining a private foundation’s permitted holdings in a 
corporation. The Regulations provide that the term “voting stock” is 
“normally” determined by reference to the power to vote for directors, 
calculated without regard to treasury stock and authorized (but unissued) 
stock.197 The Regulations specifically allow a corporation to “require the 
favorable vote of more than a majority of the directors, or of the 
outstanding voting stock” for extraordinary corporate actions, such as 
amendments to the organization’s articles of incorporation or bylaws.198 
Similarly, convertible or contingent stock will be treated as non-voting 
stock until the voting rights attributable to the stock actually vest.199 
C. Permitted Holdings in a Partnership or Joint Venture 
In stark contrast to the statutory provisions regarding corporations, 
Code Section 4943(c)(3) does not contain significant detail with regard 
to the calculation of the permitted holdings of a private foundation in 
non-corporate entities.200 Rather, Code Section 4943(c)(3) provides that 
195.  Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(b)(2)(ii). 
196.  26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(2)(A) (flush language).  
197.  Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(b)(1)(ii). 
198.  Id. 
199.  Id. § 53.4943-3(b)(2). 
200.  See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201007062 (Nov. 25, 2009) (limited liability partnership 
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“the permitted holdings of a private foundation in any business 
enterprise which is not incorporated shall be determined under 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary.”201 The statute then provides 
that the regulations be “consistent in principle”202 with the corporate 
rules set forth in Section 4943(c)(2); special rules, however, apply for 
three different categories of entities: (1) partnerships and joint 
ventures,203 (2) sole proprietorships,204 and (3) “any other case.”205 
When applying the principles of the corporate rules of Section 
4943(c)(2) to partnerships and joint ventures, the statute provides that 
the term “profits interest” replaces “voting stock,” and “capital interest” 
replaces the term “nonvoting stock.”206 The Regulations provide that one 
should simply substitute this language when reading Treasury 
Regulation § 53.4943-3(b), which details the rules for corporate holdings 
under Code Section 4943(c)(2).207 Accordingly, if the foundation meets 
the 20% rule with regard to the profits interest in the partnership, then it 
appears that the foundation could hold an unlimited capital interest in the 
partnership. 
Under the corporate rules, the calculation of permitted holdings 
focuses on voting control, which addresses Congress’ concern regarding 
the diversion of foundation attention away from charitable activities in 
favor of business interests. When applying these rules to partnerships, 
however, the calculation of permitted holdings is based on economic 
interest and not on voting control.208 Under the regulations, a private 
foundation’s interest in the profits of a partnership is determined “in the 
same manner as its distributive share” of partnership taxable income 
under Code Section 704(b).209 Code Section 704(b) governs the 
allocation of items of income and deduction among partners. In general, 
the terms of the partnership agreement govern the allocation of items of 
income or deduction, unless either the partnership agreement is silent or 
the terms of the partnership agreement do not have “substantial 
analyzed under the partnership rules but applying the corporate 2% de minimis rule in Code Section 
4943(c)(2)(C) as consistent in principle). 
201.  26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(3). 
202.  Id. 
203.  See id. § 4943(c)(3)(A). 
204.  See id. § 4943(c)(3)(B) (explicitly providing that a private foundation may not have any 
permitted holdings in a sole proprietorship). 
205.  See id. § 4943(c)(3)(C) (2012). 
206.  Id. § 4943(c)(3)(A). 
207.  Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(c)(2) (as amended in 2009). 
208.  Id. 
209.  Id. 
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economic effect.”210 When the partnership agreement is silent, a 
partner’s share of items of income or deduction will be allocated in 
accordance with a partner’s interest in the partnership.211 
Unfortunately, there is no generally applicable definition in the 
Internal Revenue Code of a partner’s capital interest in a partnership.212 
For purposes of Section 4943, a private foundation’s capital interest is 
determined first with reference to the applicable provisions of the 
partnership agreement. In the absence of a partnership agreement 
provision, a foundation’s partnership interest for purposes of Section 
4943 is the greater of its interest upon withdrawal from the partnership 
or upon liquidation of the partnership.213 
In a similar context, the family limited partnership rules set forth 
the definition of a capital interest in a partnership in which capital is a 
material income-producing factor for purposes of Section 704(e).214 
Under these rules, the recipient of a capital interest by gift or by 
purchase in a capital-intensive partnership will be recognized as a 
partner if the transaction is bona fide.215 If, however, the donor retains 
control over the transferred interest, directly or indirectly, then the donor 
will continue to be treated as the owner of the interest for tax 
purposes.216 For purposes of Section 704(e), a partner’s capital interest 
210.  26 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2) (2012). 
211.  Id. § 704(b)(1). 
212.  Sheldon I. Banoff, Identifying Partners’ Interests in Profits and Capital: Uncertainties, 
Opportunities and Traps, TAXES –THE TAX MAG., Mar. 2007, at 223 (stating that “neither the Code 
nor regulations set forth a comprehensive definition of” a partner’s interest in partnership capital). 
213.  Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(c)(2). 
 214.  Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(ii) (as amended 2013) (“a person shall be recognized as a 
partner for income tax purposes if he owns a capital interest in such partnership whether or not such 
interest is derived by purchase or gift from any other person”); Banoff, supra note 212, at 223.  
215.  Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iii). 
216.  A transfer of a capital interest to a family limited partnership may, however, be treated as 
a “mere sham for tax avoidance or evasion purposes” if the donor remains the real owner of the 
interest through the retention of dominion and control over the capital interest that he purported to 
transfer. Id. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iii). One factor that may indicate a sham transaction is the “retention of 
management powers inconsistent with the normal relationships among partners.” Id. § 1.704-
1(e)(2)(ii)(d). Thus, if a family member attempted to transfer a capital interest to a foundation and 
retain ultimate management control over the interest by indirect means, Section 704(e) might 
continue to recognize the donor as the partner for income tax purposes. At no point does Code 
Section 4943 or its Regulations reference Code Section 704(e) directly, however, so it is unclear 
whether and how this might apply for excise tax purposes.  Presumably, as Code Section 704(e) 
would affect the determination of a partner’s capital and profits interests under Code Section 704(b), 
and therefore would apply indirectly. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(c)(2). Section 704(e) was added 
to the Code as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (Pub .L. No. 94-455, § 213(c)(3)(A), 90 Stat. 
1520), six years after the enactment of Code Section 4943. To the extent that Section 704(e) might 
currently act to constrain some creative partnership capital interest allocations, it could not have 
acted as such at the time that Code Section 4943 was enacted. 
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in a partnership is determined with respect to the owner’s interest in the 
partnership upon withdrawal or liquidation.217 By implication, however, 
this section acknowledges that management rights could be transferred 
with a capital interest in a partnership. 
Under the capital and profits test of Code Section 4943, the 
question of voting control of the partnership becomes essentially 
irrelevant.218 The underlying assumption may have been that, because 
the capital interests in the partnership would normally be liable for 
losses on dissolution, the capital interests, therefore, must have been 
general partners with management rights. This does not appear to be 
mandated by state law—a limited partner, by definition, belies this 
assumption. A limited partner has a capital interest in the partnership but 
is typically unable to be involved in most management decisions other 
than major life-cycle voting (dissolution, amendment, bankruptcy, etc.) 
in exchange for the partner’s liability protection.219 Under a voting 
control based analysis, limited partners look much like non-voting stock 
holders. In spite of this similarity, it is very clear that limited partners are 
not treated in the same manner as non-voting shareholders because the 
permitted holdings test for partnerships does not look at governance 
control but at profits interest.220 
217.  Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(v). 
 218.  See Banoff, supra note 212, at 254 (“Code Sec. 4943 . . . is unique in its ‘disconnect’ for 
purposes of measuring ‘relatedness’ with respect to corporate stock and partnership interests, 
respectively.”). 
219.  At the time of the enactment of Section 4943 in 1969, the original Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act passed in 1916 was still the standard for limited partnership statutes, with the first 
set of major revisions later to occur in 1976. See Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) (2001) (Last Amended 2013): Summary, UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/Limited%20Partnership/ulpa%20last%20amended%2020
13%20summary_Jan%202015_GH%20Edits.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2015). Under section 7 of the 
1916 version of ULPA, a limited partner lost liability protection if, “in addition to the exercise of his 
rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the business.” UNIF. LTD. 
P’SHIP ACT § 7 (1916). Section 10 of the 1916 version of ULPA generally gives management power 
to the general partner. Id. § 10. 
The most recent version of this legislation, the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA) 
was adopted by the Uniform Law Commission in 2001. RULPA § 302 provides that limited 
partners have no power to act for or bind the limited partnership; however, RULPA § 303 provides 
that a limited partner is not personally liable for the debts of the partnership “even if the limited 
partner participates in the management and control of the limited partnership.” UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP 
ACT §§ 302-303 (2001) (amended 2013). Therefore, under current law, the assumption that a 
limited partner would not have any governance rights over the partnership would not be entirely 
correct.  
220.  I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,195 (Mar. 15, 1984). 
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D. Permitted Holdings in an “Etc.” 
The title to Code Section 4943(c)(3) is “Permitted Holdings in 
Partnerships, Etc.,” leaving open the possibility that other types of 
unincorporated business entities might need to be analyzed under 
Section 4943(c)(3). Section 4943(c)(3)(C) provides the rules for 
determining permitted holdings in “any other case”—that is, any case 
that is not a corporation, partnership or joint venture, or sole 
proprietorship.221 While it appears that this language was aimed 
primarily (but not exclusively) at capturing holdings of business 
enterprises held through trusts,222 by its terms, it should apply to any 
type of business enterprise not discussed in the other provisions of 
Section 4943(c). 
For these other entities, Section 4943(c)(3)(C) provides that the 
Secretary of the Treasury should promulgate regulations for determining 
permitted holdings that are consistent with the corporate rules, with the 
term “beneficial interest” substituted for the term “voting stock.” 
Significantly, unlike partnerships, there is no analogous language for 
“non-voting” stock in an “other unincorporated entity.”223 
The regulations further provide that a beneficial interest in an 
“unincorporated business enterprise” other than a partnership is 
determined with reference to the right to receive profits, or if such 
amount is not fixed by an agreement among the participants, then by the 
fight to receive assets upon liquidation.224 If there is no agreement, then 
beneficial interest is determined on a pro rata basis by dividing the 
foundation’s contribution by the sum of all capital contributions made 
(or obliged to be made) to the entity.225 This formulation of the 
calculation of permitted holdings looks very similar to the general 
profit/capital distinction applied by the Regulations to partnerships, with 
one significant distinction: one cannot use a pure capital interest as a 
substitute for non-voting corporate stock when reading the corporate 
rules of Code Section 4943(c)(3)(A) and Treasury Regulation Section 
221.  26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(3)(C) (2012). 
 222.  The title to the applicable regulation is “Trusts and other unincorporated business 
enterprises.” The Service has ruled that working interests in oil and gas wells should be analyzed 
under the beneficial interest rule. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8920012 (Feb. 8, 1989); see also I.R.S. Priv. 
Ltr. Rul. 9715031 (Jan. 13, 1997) (potentially applying Code Section 4943 to a management 
agreement allowing for a 20% profits interest, although the Service determined that no matter what 
entity rule applied, there would be no excess business holding due to the 20% cap on profits). 
223.  Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(c)(4)(i) (as amended in 2009). 
224.  Id. § 53.4943-3(c)(4)(iii). 
225.  Id. 
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53.4943-3(b).226 
As with partnerships and joint ventures, the calculation of permitted 
holdings of other entities focuses on economic interest and not on 
governance control. In a private trust, legal control over investments and 
stock is by definition in the hands of the trustee, who has no beneficial 
interest in the trust. The beneficial interests held by the beneficiaries of 
the trust are purely economic in nature.227 Similarly, for unincorporated 
business enterprises that are not trusts, the calculation of permitted 
holdings focuses on economic interests and makes no reference to 
control of the underlying business entity. Unlike partnerships and trusts, 
where the underlying laws governing the entities might provide some 
base assumptions regarding the connection between control and 
economic interest, there are no such baselines for unincorporated 
business enterprises—and there cannot be, as Treasury did not know at 
the time what the legal form of those enterprises actually might be. 
E. Permitting Holdings in LLCs: Current Law 
Because LLCs did not exist at the time that Code Section 4943 was 
enacted, the statute does not mention LLCs explicitly. Similarly, the 
Regulations, which were promulgated primarily in 1977,228 do not 
mention LLCs. Accordingly, private foundations are left to shoe horn 
LLCs into the existing language of a statute that did not contemplate 
their existence. There are two ways in which the current statute could 
address LLCs: (1) recognizing the entity’s classification as determined 
under check-the-box or (2) treating the LLC as an “other unincorporated 
entity” under Code Section 4943(c)(3)(C). 
1. Check-the-Box
Code Section 4943 could recognize the check-the-box regime, 
which would allow an LLC to opt into corporation status or partnership 
status by election.229 If the LLC made the election to be treated as a 
corporation, the LLC would then explicitly avail itself of the corporate 
permitted holdings rules of Code Section 4943(c)(2), including the use 
226.  See id. § 53.4943-3(b); 26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(3)(A). 
 227.  Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(c)(4)(ii) provides that the beneficial interest in a trust for 
purposes of Code Section 4943 is held by the remainder beneficiaries as determined under Treas. 
Reg. § 53.4943-8(b) (2013). 
228.  T.D. 7496, 1977-2 C.B. 390 (1977).  
229.  See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200124022 (Mar. 13, 2001) (treating a single member LLC 
as a disregarded entity in conformance with the check-the-box regulations). 
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of non-voting stock.230 The disadvantage, of course, is that the LLC that 
elects corporate treatment loses its pass-through income taxation.231 
If an LLC did not check the box and, therefore, defaulted to 
partnership status, the partnership rules would apply. The LLC would 
have the ability to structure its capital and profits interests in the manner 
of its choosing—any partner holding a naked capital interest in the 
partnership would essentially be treated as having non-voting stock.232 
As Code Section 704(b) provides that the allocation of capital interests 
and profits interests contained in the partnership agreements is respected 
so long as the allocation has substantial economic effect, the LLC treated 
as a partnership would have significant leeway in structuring the 
partnership’s capital structure. Thus, it would be possible to give the 
entire capital interest in an LLC to the private foundation, as long as the 
ownership of the profits interests in the LLC met the general permitted 
holdings rule.233 It would also be possible to give capital interest to 
family members that were not otherwise disqualified persons, as the 
capital interest would not cause the holder to become a disqualified 
person.234 As the partnership rules do not care about governance control 
for purposes of permitted holdings, it appears that the foundation’s (or 
other non-disqualified person family member’s) capital interests could 
be imbued with such governance authority (including voting for the 
manager or governing members) as the LLC might determine to be 
appropriate.235 
 230.  Another benefit of corporate status is that the private foundation may be eligible to use 
the exception from the self-dealing excise for certain corporate reorganizations under Section 
4941(d)(2)(F), which by its terms does not apply to unincorporated entities. 
 231.  One of the reasons why an LLC might elect corporate treatment is so it may apply for 
tax-exempt status itself. See generally Robert W. Fritz, The Evolving Use of Limited Liability 
Companies by Tax-Exempt Organizations, 13 TAX’N OF EXEMPTS 112, 115 (2001). If the LLC were 
able to establish an independent basis for tax-exempt status, it is likely that the LLC would qualify 
as a functionally related business under 26 U.S.C. § 4943(d)(3)(A) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4942(j)(4) 
(2012)) and therefore be exempt from the limitations of Section 4943 altogether because it would 
not meet the definition of a “business enterprise.” 
 232.  In addition, the holder of a naked capital interest in the partnership would not be a 
disqualified person by virtue of the holding, as the disqualified person status of a partnership is 
determined solely with reference to profits interest. 26 U.S.C. § 4946(a)(1)(C)(iii) & (a)(1)(F) 
(2012). 
 233.  It is clear that the capital interest could not have a corresponding profits interest and be 
treated as non-voting stock. Thus, limited partnership interests do not automatically qualify as a 
non-voting stock equivalent, even though a limited partnership interest typically does not have the 
right to participate in the management of the partnership. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,195 (Mar. 15, 
1984). 
234.  26 U.S.C. § 4946(a)(1)(C)(iii) and (a)(1)(F). 
 235.  Subject, possibly, to the family limited partnership rules of 26 U.S.C. § 704(e) (2012), 
which might work to treat the donor as the continuing partner for purposes of the income tax. 
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Section 7701 itself appears to support this approach. Section 
7701(a), which includes the definitions of the terms “corporation” and 
partnership,” begins by stating that the definitions in that section apply 
any time they are used in the whole of Title 26 unless “otherwise 
distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent 
thereof.”236 An entity’s classification under Section 7701 is effective for 
all federal tax purposes,237 with the certain limited exceptions not 
applicable here. At the time the check-the-box regulations were written, 
Treasury could have and did make exceptions to their general 
applicability to all federal tax matters.238 It did not make such an 
exception for the private foundation excise taxes generally or Section 
4943 specifically. 
2. “Other Unincorporated Enterprise”
Alternatively, the excess business holdings rules could ignore the 
check-the-box regime and classify entities on the basis of state law. 
Under this analysis, an LLC is not a partnership for state law purposes 
and, therefore, would not be analyzed under the capital and profits 
interest rule of Code Section 4943(c)(3)(A). Rather, the LLC would 
always be treated as an “etc.”—an unincorporated entity (other than a 
partnership or sole proprietorship) under state law analyzed under the 
beneficial interest rule of Section 4943(c)(3)(C). Under this analysis, the 
LLC’s treatment for excess business holdings purposes would be 
divorced from its federal tax classification under Section 7701. 
For LLCs taxed as corporations, the difference in analysis is 
significant: the permitted holdings in the corporate LLC are determined 
based on governance rights, while the permitted holdings for the “other 
unincorporated enterprise” LLC are based on economic interest. For the 
LLC taxed as a partnership, it may be that the “other unincorporated 
enterprise method” and the partnership interest rules under check-the-
box align, as the permitted holdings in each are based primarily on a 
profits/capital distinction. As a practical matter, if the LLC is organized 
on a straight pro rata basis with regard to profits and capital interest, then 
236.  26 U.S.C. § 7701(a) (2012). 
 237.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(g)(2) (as amended in 2014) provides that the “tax treatment of 
a change in the classification of an entity for federal tax purposes by election . . . is determined 
under all relevant provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and the general principles of tax law, 
including the step transaction doctrine.” 
238.  As previously mentioned, there are specific exceptions from the wholly owned entity 
rules for certain excise taxes (not Chapter 42) and for employment taxes. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
2(c)(2)(v) (as amended in 2014); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2T (as amended 2014). 
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the result under each rule would be the same.239 For an LLC treated as a 
pro rata partnership, the primary difference between the two 
methodologies comes in the treatment of the non-voting stock 
equivalent, as the statute explicitly disallows an “other unincorporated 
enterprise” from substituting a capital interest for non-voting stock.240 Of 
course, nothing requires the LLC to be a pure pro rata arrangement with 
regard to capital and profits interests—one of the strengths of the LLC is 
its flexibility in drafting governance provisions that meet the needs of its 
members.241 
If the check-the-box rule is used, the provision in the statute 
addressing the permitted holdings of unincorporated entities would 
essentially be applied to joint ventures and co-ownership arrangements 
that did not rise to the level of a business entity.242 Under the check-the-
box rules, all other business entities would be either corporations or 
partnerships. This would be contrary to the current interpretation of the 
statute in the Regulations, which explicitly details rules for determining 
a private foundation’s permitted holdings in an unincorporated entity 
other than a trust—these provisions would essentially become obsolete, 
at least until the next new state law business entity type comes along.243 
3. So Which One Is It?
Sadly, based on a review of existing administrative guidance, it is 
not clear which path is the correct one. Because the results in many 
situations are essentially the same, it can lead to confusion on the path 
taken to get to those results. 
In many cases, the IRS has disposed of the excess business 
holdings issues involving LLCs on the basis that the LLC is not a 
“business enterprise.” As indicated previously, the excess business 
holdings rules applies to private foundation holdings in a “business 
 239.  See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,195 (Mar. 15, 1984) (limited partnership interests with 
pro rata shares of both profits and capital are not equivalent to non-voting shares). 
240.  26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(4)(B) (2012). 
 241.  See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 110 cmt. (2006) (“A limited liability company 
is as much a creature of contract as of statute. . . . The operating agreement is the exclusive 
consensual process for modifying this Act’s various default rules pertaining to relationships inter se 
the members and between members and the limited liability company.”). 
242.  The only other arrangements that might be covered would be co-ownership arrangements, 
although many of these could rise to the level of a partnership or joint venture, which are clearly 
governed by Code Section 4943(c)(3)(A). See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8920012 (Feb. 8, 1989) 
(working interests in oil and gas properties held directly by a foundation possibly analyzed as an 
unincorporated business enterprise). 
243.  See Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(c)(iii) (as amended in 2009). 
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enterprise”; if an entity is not a “business enterprise,” then Section 4943 
simply does not apply.244 Code Section 4943(d)(3) specifically provides 
that an entity is not a business enterprise if 95% of its gross income is 
generated from passive sources.245 Thus, many rulings find that LLCs 
are not business enterprises due to the 95% passive income rule. In those 
rulings, the IRS’ discussion of the permitted holdings rules for LLCs is 
not determinative of the outcome of the ruling and, therefore, is often 
vague or incomplete. 
For example, in Private Letter Ruling (PLR) 201333020,246 the IRS 
leans toward a check-the-box analysis, but this analysis is not 
determinative for purposes of the ruling. In this case, a private 
foundation held an interest in a hedge fund. The hedge fund was 
organized as an LLC and taxed as a partnership for federal income tax 
purposes.247 Another member of the LLC held all of the Class B 
membership interests in the LLC, which represented a 10% income 
interest in the LLC. This member proposed to give all of the Class B 
membership interests to the private foundation.248 In reciting the law 
applicable to the foundation’s permitted holdings in the LLC, the IRS 
noted that a private foundation is allowed 20% of the voting stock of a 
corporation reduced by the holdings of its disqualified persons.249 It went 
on to state that “I.R.C. §4943(c)(3) provides that for interest in any 
partnership or joint venture the word ‘profit interest’ should be 
substituted for the word ‘voting stock’ in the definition of permitted 
holdings.”250 Note that, while the ruling did not cite specifically to the 
partnership rule (§ 4943(c)(3)(A)), it did mention that it was applying 
the partnership rule.251 The ruling made no mention of unincorporated 
enterprises other than partnerships, which would have been covered by § 
4943(c)(3)(C)). Later in the ruling, it again discussed the partnership rule 
(with citation to § 4943(c)(3) as a whole), although it is not 
244.  26 U.S.C. § 4943(a). 
 245.  Id. § 4943(d)(3)(B). Passive sources include the items excluded from the unrelated 
business income tax under Section 512(b)(1), (2) and (5) as well as the income from the sales of 
goods not manufactured or actively distributed by the entity. Id. § 4943(d)(3) (flush language). 
246.  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201333020 (Aug. 16, 2013) (LLC that was taxed as a partnership for 
federal income tax purposes operated an investment hedge fund; LLC was not a business enterprise 
within the meaning of Section 4943(d)(3), but the IRS also noted that “the holdings of the LLC will 
not be excess business holdings”).  
247.  Id. 
248.  Id. 
249.  Id. 
250.  Id. 
251.  Id. 
42
Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss3/2
2015] BETTER LATE THAN NEVER 527 
determinative of the ruling.252 Once again, the IRS held that the hedge 
fund would not be a business enterprise that was even subject to Section 
4943, although it went on to state that “the holdings of LLC will not be 
excess business holdings” without further analysis.253 Although it is not 
entirely explicit, it certainly looks like the Service was leaning toward 
analyzing the LLC as a partnership under § 4943(c)(3)(A) and not as an 
unincorporated business entity under § 4943(c)(3)(C). 
On the other hand, PLR 200650018, which discussed a private 
foundation’s excess business holdings in an LLC that owned farm 
property and operations,254 appears to use the “other unincorporated 
enterprise” rule for analyzing LLC permitted holdings. This PLR noted, 
“under section 4943(c)(3) a private foundation is permitted to hold up to 
twenty percent of the profits interest in an unincorporated business 
enterprise.”255 As with the citation in PLR 201333020 (discussed above), 
the ruling citation did not does not distinguish between the partnership 
rule (contained in § 4943(c)(3)(A)) or the other unincorporated entity 
rule (contained in § 4943(c)(3)(C)), although it did use the term 
“unincorporated business enterprise.”256 Later in the PLR, the IRS noted 
that the foundation would have an excess business holding because its 
“ownership and profits interests in the Farm and [LLC] . . . both exceed 
twenty percent.”257 At first glance, this appears to be a partnership 
analysis;258 however, the Regulations for other unincorporated 
associations discuss analyzing a beneficial interest with reference to, 
first, a profits interest and then to a dissolution or liquidation interest—
which is a similar (although not identical) test for a capital interest in a 
partnership. The ruling did not use the term “capital” interest but rather 
talked about “ownership.”259 The PLR itself was a request for an 
extension of the five-year period in which a private foundation must 
dispose of certain excess holdings—as a result, the PLR was able to 
address the extension issue while still stating, “We do not rule on 
whether your interest in the LLC constitutes an excess business 
252.  Id. 
253.  Id. 
254.  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200650018 (Sept. 21, 2006). 
255.  Id. 
256.  Id. 
257.  Id. 
258.  See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200517031 (Feb. 2, 2005) (finding no excess business 
holdings on other grounds, but citing the partnership rules found in Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(c)(2) as 
the basis for determining the permitted holdings in an LLC). 
259.  Id. 
43
Waterhouse Wilson: Better Late Than Never
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
528 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:485 
holding.”260 
Distributions from limited partnerships, themselves, can be deemed 
passive income.261 In PLR 200611034, the Service stated that “[l]imited 
partner interests are passive investment that are comparable to stock and 
securities. As with a holder of corporate stock, a limited partner does not 
participate in the trade or business.”262 In support of this proposition, the 
Service noted that the characterization of limited partner interests as 
passive, and therefore not business enterprises altogether, is compatible 
with the purpose of Section 4943. “One of the concerns of lawmakers 
was that foundation managers paid too much attention to the 
maintenance and improvement of business interests to the detriment of 
the time and energy expended on charitable duties.”263 The IRS was 
comfortable with this ruling because traditional notions of limited 
partnership provide that the limited partner could not be involved in the 
management of the business. Therefore, by definition, the foundation, as 
a limited partner, could not be diverted away from charitable activities 
by his or her involvement in the limited partnership, as there was no 
such involvement. 
If a private foundation held a capital interest in an LLC that was 
taxed as a partnership under the check-the-box rules, nothing in the 
language of Code Section 4943 or in the statutory framework of most 
state enabling statutes would prevent the private foundation from having 
governance rights. Thus, the underlying assumption that a diversion 
from charitable activities cannot happen with a limited partner due to the 
state law prohibition on the exercise of most administrative powers by a 
limited partner does not work with an LLC.264 
IV. OPTIONS FOR INCORPORATING LLCS EXPLICITLY INTO SECTION
4943 
A.  Framework for Evaluating Options 
The discussions that preceded the enactment of Code Section 4943 
 260.  Id. See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200438042 (Sept. 17, 2004) and I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
200438043 (Sept. 17, 2004) (citing but not analyzing the unincorporated business enterprise rules in 
a request for the extension of the five-year period to dispose of holdings in an LLC taxed as a 
partnership for federal income tax purposes). 
261.  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200611034 (Mar. 17, 2006). 
262.  Id. 
263.  Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 413 Pt. 1, at 27 (1969); S. Rep. No. 552, at 38-39 (1969)). 
264.  The current version of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership would grant limited 
partners a greater ability to participate in limited partnership management without losing limited 
liability. See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT §§ 302-303 (2001) (amended 2013). 
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indicate that Congress saw the private foundation as an important 
vehicle to advance “individual experimentation and the exercise of 
creative imagination” in the public space.265 The 1965 Report adopted a 
pluralism theory of tax exemption,266 which emphasizes the need for 
charitable vehicles that encourage innovation and diversity of thought. 
Pluralism theory posits that the nonprofit sector, controlled by neither 
government nor business, provides an outlet for discourse and debate 
that is not beholden to these interests.267 Nicholas Cafardi, in a speech on 
the necessity of the nonprofit sector, stated: 
Imagine, if you will, an America in which the public discourse is 
265.  1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 35. 
 266.  BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS §1.3, at 9-11 (10th ed. 
2011); Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis, 
Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395, (1997) (viewing promotion of pluralism and 
diversity as a “metabenefit” under traditional subsidy theory); John G. Simon, Charity and Dynasty 
Under the Federal Tax System, 5 PROB. LAW. 1, 70 (1978) (citing various examples of critical 
foundation support for “dissenting and unorthodox ideas”). 
267.  Lawrence M. Stone, Federal Tax Support of Charities and Other Exempt Organizations: 
The Need for a National Policy, 1968 U. SO. CAL. L. CTR. TAX INST. 27, 39-40 (“charity . . . 
provides a unique and flexible form of social organization that counterbalances the vast power of 
government and the concentrated wealth of the private sector”); Simon, supra note 266, at 74. See 
also Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 
OHIO. ST. L.J. 1379, 1430-31 (1991) (citation omitted) (discussing “classic liberalism and the value 
of pluralism” in the context of a donative theory of tax exemption, where “the charitable subsidy [is] 
distributed automatically based on autonomous decisions by individual donors that determine which 
activities within the nonprofit sector are socially valued”).  
The notion that, free from government and business interference, a charity would be unfettered in its 
pursuit of its charitable goals is not without its flaws. For example, without the ability to offer stock, 
nonprofits are unable to access equity markets to fund their charitable activities. Henry B. 
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980) (tax-exempt status is 
justified to compensate nonprofits for their inability to access capital due to the non-distribution 
constraint). Accordingly, nonprofits must find other sources of funds—for the private foundation, 
that typically means contributions from its founder, his or her family members, and affiliated 
businesses. The nonprofit is then at the whim of its donors if it does not have an independent source 
of funding. If the strength of the foundation is its ability to realize the ideas of innovative thinkers, 
its flaw is its compulsion to follow the whims of idiosyncratic donors. See Simon, supra note 266, at 
page 69 (“One can imagine a second, somewhat less elitist, proposition that might go like this: 
whether or not wealthy givers are better suited to uphold cultural and intellectual standards, affluent 
individuals are more likely to be idiosyncratic or unorthodox. . . . Whatever the reason, such 
idiosyncrasy or heterodoxy is more likely to result in a charitable product that is different from what 
majoritarian preferences might produce, thus justifying the inegalitarian charitable deduction in the 
name of pluralism”). At least in the case of the private foundation, contributions already received 
can produce a flow of funds that would support its charitable mission even if no further donations 
were received. See generally Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence 
of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 461 (1996) 
(“Each of the nonprofit’s constituents has its own goals, which can be furthered either by exercising 
‘voice’ (imposing conditions on the donation or contract) or ‘exit” rights (withholding future 
donations or dealings).”). 
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controlled and the public agenda is set by a confluence of government 
and commerce, without anyone to say them nay. What kind of America 
would that be? I suggest to you that it would not be a very free 
America. 
Something more is needed, something that keeps government and 
business from controlling our entire way of life. This is what the 
[nonprofit sector] does. Its very existence guarantees the lively public 
debate that makes American society so unique in the world . . . .268 
It is clear from the discussion in the 1965 Report that Congress 
valued the unique role that private foundations played in the charitable 
sector specifically and in society generally. At the time, many critics 
advocated for abolition of the private foundation or at least imposition of 
a requirement of full payout of all assets within a short time frame.269 
Congress resisted these calls by highlighting the unique strengths of the 
private foundation.270 Private foundations provided a dedicated 
endowment for charitable purposes, thus ensuring the long-term viability 
of the charitable sector generally. A private foundation is not, however, 
wedded to another charity like other types of endowments, such as the 
university endowment or the supporting organization.271 Accordingly, 
the private foundation has the flexibility to vary its beneficiaries in a 
way that other endowment-type organizations cannot. A private 
foundation can support multiple causes and  adapt and change its 
funding streams as projects may require. 
It is this flexibility that Congress appeared to value most.272 As a 
private foundation does not need to appeal to a broad cross-section of the 
general public for funding, it is free to pursue those projects and issues 
that it determines to be appropriate.273 In furtherance of these projects, it 
can impose requirements and outcomes through its grant agreement. It 
can agree to multi-year funding in order to provide stability to a 
 268.  Nicholas P. Cafardi, Address at the Meeting of the Westmoreland County Bar Ass’n: The 
Third Sector (Nov. 13, 1992), in TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 123 
(Nicholas P. Cafardi & Jaclyn Fabean Cherry eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
269.  Crimm, supra note 9, 1114-15. 
270.  1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 11-12. 
271.  Public university endowments are typically public charities under Code Section 509(a)(1) 
by virtue of being described in Code Section 170(b)(1)(a)(iv), which requires the expenditures to be 
made to or for the benefit of a public college or university. In order to qualify as a public charity by 
virtue of being a supporting organization, the supporting organization must have a defined 
relationship with one or more other public charities (called supported organizations) and may not 
make distributions for any other purpose. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 509(a)(3) (2012). 
272.  1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 12. 
273.  Id. 
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project;274 it can also provide that funding can be withdrawn in order to 
encourage individual projects to find other funding in the marketplace of 
charitable ideas. As the private foundation is not bound to a particular 
charity (except for its own voluntary grant agreements), it can pivot to 
other grant recipients or even other projects as it deems necessary.275 
This may be because a project has been successfully completed, because 
the project was a worthy but ultimately unsuccessful experiment, or 
because the problem to be address has changed in some way to make the 
project moot.276 Regardless of the reason, Congress believed that the 
flexibility of the private foundation put it in a unique position to fund 
innovation and add to the pluralism of ideas in the charitable sector. 
Through the excess business holdings excise tax, Congress sought 
to protect and enhance a private foundation’s innovative approach to 
charity by requiring the foundation’s attention and assets to be focused 
on these creative philanthropic endeavors.277 Thus, in the corporate 
context, the statute prevents the diversion of a private foundation’s 
attention toward business endeavors by limiting the private foundation’s 
ability to hold stock (using, perhaps inadvisably, partnership 
profits/capital distinction as a flawed proxy278 for control).279 As 
indicated, however, this limitation did not extend to passive income, as 
Congress understood that part of the job of a private foundation is to 
invest and grow its assets.280 Similarly, it did not extend this to 
functionally related businesses, as there was an acknowledgement that 
 274.  For example, for purposes of meeting the mandatory distribution requirements of Code 
Section 4942, a private foundation may, under certain circumstances, set aside funds for a multi-
year, specific project but treat them as distributed in the year of the set-aside. See 26 U.S.C. § 
4942(g)(2) (2012). 
 275.  Code Section 4945 generally allows a private foundation to fund charitable activities 
(within the meaning of Code Section 170(c)(2)(b)) carried on by any entity—even a for-profit 
entity. 26 U.S.C. § 4945(d) (2012). There are, however, administrative requirements for certain 
grants to individuals and grants to non-public charities ostensibly designed to ensure that a non-
public charity will dedicate the funds to charitable purposes. See id. § 4945(g)-(h). 
 276.  Of course, the downside of all of this flexibility is that charitable assets may be wasted on 
the larks of wayward boards. With no shareholders to constrain spending, there is little impetus to 
control for waste—especially in the endowed foundation, where the funding stream continues 
unabated into perpetuity—or at least as long as the investment managers do their jobs. See generally 
Brody, supra note 267, at 463-64.  
277.  Stone, supra note 267, at 51. 
 278.  Banoff, supra note 212, at 255 (criticizing the use of partner capital and profits interest as 
a measure of relatedness, stating, “[i]f the concern underlying ‘relatedness’ is manipulation or 
collusion for tax purposes by a partner and his controlled partnership, ‘control’ can be defined other 
than by reference to [profits, capital], or the relative value of the partners’ interests”). 
279.  For a critique of the argument that holding voting stock is tantamount to operating 
business involvement, see Schmalbeck, supra note 19, at 84. 
280.  Id. at 61-2; see also 1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. 
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charitable purposes could be furthered through investments in 
businesses.281 
When evaluating the options for incorporating LLCs explicitly into 
the statutory provisions of Section 4943, one could simply be guided by 
this original Congressional intent. There is the possibility that Congress’ 
original intent, while well-meaning, is sufficiently dated as to no longer 
provide appropriate guidelines for informing future revisions to Section 
4943’s statutory and regulatory provisions. An argument can still be 
made, however, that the tensions that informed the passage of Code 
Section 4943 in the 1960s remain relevant today. One need look no 
further than the current debate over social enterprise to see this same 
issue up for discussion today: how can the legal framework regulating 
charities encourage the flexibility to allow people to creatively address 
social problems while preventing the misuse of charitable assets? 
One of the strengths of the social enterprise entity is its flexibility—
it is not constrained by nonprofit limitations or corporate benefit 
maximization directives. A social enterprise typically combines in a 
single entity the dual missions of profit seeking through active business 
operations and the accomplishment of charitable goals—the exact 
combination of activities that Congress attempted to regulate through the 
enactment of Code Section 4943.282 Proponents of social enterprise posit 
that the combination of for-profit methods and the charitable outcomes 
need not be in conflict with one another. Rather, in the correct 
combination, business goals and methodologies can enhance, not distract 
from, the foundation’s charitable mission.283 In fact, social enterprise 
highlights the synergies of business and charity that will encourage 
“individual experimentation and the exercise of creative imagination”284 
in the entrepreneurial-minded285—the same result professed to be the 
 281.  26 U.S.C. § 4943(d)(3)(A) (2012) (excluding functionally related business from the 
definition of business enterprise.) 
 282.  John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for 
L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 117 (2010) (stating the L3C “unites 
in one enterprise two principles often considered irreconcilably in competition with each other: 
pursuing charitable exempt purposes and generating and distributing profits”). 
 283.  The Social Enterprise Alliance is one of the primary organizations promoting social 
enterprise, stating that social enterprise is the “Missing Middle,” combining efficiency, 
sustainability, creativity, and generosity in a way not seen in the traditional sectors of the economy. 
See What We’re All About, SOC. ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, https://se-
alliance.org/why#whatwereallabout (last visited Nov. 14, 2014); see also Thomas Kelley, Law and 
Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337 (2009). 
284.  1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 35. 
 285.  Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 8, at 427 (stating, “Social entrepreneurs . . . desire the 
flexibility to seek non-traditional approaches in conducting their business and to access a broad 
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benefit of private foundations according to the 1965 Report. 
While the possibility of synergy exists, the tension between 
business and charitable goals within social enterprise remains. One of 
the issues that Code Section 4943 was intended to address was whether 
the attention of a private foundation was focused on its charitable 
mission or diverted to business endeavors. Similarly, one of the 
perceived weaknesses of social enterprise (at least from a nonprofit 
perspective) is that there is little guidance on exactly how “charitable” a 
social enterprise must be, both at inception and operationally. While 
most state L3C enabling statutes at least require the charitable purpose 
of the enterprise to be significant,286 there is no similar requirement in 
most benefit corporation legislation.287 In fact, in the benefit corporation 
context, many statutes specifically give the board of directors of the 
benefit corporation, when contemplating corporate actions, the ability to 
weigh various interests—including, but not limited to, its shareholders 
and its public purpose.288 The statute is quite clear that unless the 
organization’s articles of incorporation state to the contrary, no 
particular interest (including the public purpose) is given priority over 
another.289 
As noted by Professor Dana Brakman Reiser in her review of 
Google.org, Google’s for-profit philanthropic arm, “[w]hat begins as 
philanthropic mission could, as a result of it being embedded within a 
business, become biased toward alignment with the goals of the for-
profit company.”290 Similarly, practical considerations regarding the 
range of capital”). 
 286.  See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-26(a) (LexisNexis through the 2014 Reg. 
Sess.) (“A low-profit limited liability company shall at all times significantly further the 
accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational purposes . . .”). This requirement was 
originally intended to comply with the requirements for program-related investments as described in 
another private foundation excise tax from 1969, the jeopardizing investment excise tax of Code 
Section 4944. See 26 U.S.C. § 4944(c) (2012). 
 287.  See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31F-3-301 (LexisNexis 2014) (“A benefit corporation 
shall have as one of its purposes the purpose of creating a general public benefit.”). Connecticut’s 
benefit corporation legislation includes language attempting to make sure that any benefit 
corporation assets stay within the charitable or social enterprise realm. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
33-1355 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2015). For a review of the status of social enterprise 
organizations in the various states, see Cass Brewer, Social Enterprise Law Update and Map, 
SOCENT L. (Aug. 11, 2014), http://socentlaw.com/2014/08/social-enterprise-law-update-and-map/. 
288.  See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31F-4-401(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2014). 
 289.  See, e.g., id. § 31F-4-401(a)(3). See also Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 8, at 426 
(discussing the perils inherent in balancing the interests of the multiple stakeholders of a benefit 
corporation). 
290.  Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2465 
(2009). 
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manner in which social enterprises raise capital and interact with profit-
motivated investors may inform (or skew) the way a particular entity 
balances its business and charitable goals.291 
One of the other purported goals of Code Section 4943 was to 
prevent the potential for subtle acts of self-dealing. Attempting to 
analogize Code Section 4943 to social enterprise with regard to the 
misuse of charitable assets poses a fundamental issue. Unlike the private 
foundation, which is forbidden from making distributions for the 
personal benefit of its foundations, the social enterprise organization 
explicitly may. Indeed, that is part of the point of the social enterprise 
organization. 
Are the assets of a social enterprise organization charitable at all? 
Critics have highlighted this issue of “is it charitable?” as a potential 
concern regarding the regulation of the social enterprise organization. In 
this context, there are more questions than answers. If the social 
enterprise organization is using its charitable purpose as part of an 
appeal for capital, but the assets are not so used, is there a risk of 
misleading donors/investors that should be addressed by solicitation or 
similar legislation?292 If assets given to a social enterprise organization 
are supposed to be used for charity, does that give regulators on the state 
and federal level the ability to enforce that use?293 If some of the assets 
of a social enterprise are, in fact, dedicated to charity, how much benefit 
can accrue to the enterprise’s owners before it is too much?294 
 291.  Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations – A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 609-10 (2011). 
 292.  Id. at 615 (critiquing the benefit corporation’s reporting mechanism, which is intended to 
inform shareholders and other constituents of the social benefit activities of the organization); 
Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 8, at 436 (“The public perception that charitable enterprises are 
valuable and deserve subsidy is vulnerable, however, and attempts by hybrid promoters to tap into 
that sentiment could have serious consequences.”).  
 293.  Illinois’ L3C legislation is fairly unique in that it explicitly subjects an L3C to the state’s 
Charitable Trust Act, which in turn authorizes oversight by the Attorney General. See 805 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-26(d) (LexisNexis through the 2014 Reg. Sess.); Charitable Trust Act, 
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/1 (LexisNexis through the 2014 Reg. Sess.); Mayer & Ganahl, supra 
note 8, at 432-36 (discussing the weaknesses of current oversight of social enterprise organizations); 
Tyler, supra note 282, at 150 (arguing that traditional charitable nonprofit enforcement tools are not 
appropriate for social enterprise organizations); Evelyn Brody & John Tyler, Respecting Foundation 
and Charity Autonomy: How Public is Private Philanthropy, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571 (2010). 
 294.  See, e.g., supra note 287 (discussing Connecticut’s attempt to insure that assets 
contributed to a social enterprise would be “locked in” to those purposes). In the federal income tax 
context, Mayer and Ganahl in Taxing Social Enterprise consider the issues that would arise if the 
Internal Revenue Code provided tax benefits to social enterprise in order to subsidize socially 
beneficial behavior and reward risk-taking, but note that if the entity ultimately turns a profit, then 
“the profits (and the subsidy) will flow to investors, providing a private benefit”). Mayer & Ganahl, 
supra note 8, at 429.  
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Although there are few, if any, answers to these questions in the 
social enterprise context, we can look back to see how Congress 
struggled to answer similar questions in the context of Code Section 
4943. If an organization holds itself out to the public as charitable and, 
as a result, benefits from tax-exemption, should the public expect a 
certain level of charitable use? Is there a role for state and federal 
regulators in enforcing this expectation? And how much can the 
founders of the foundation benefit from otherwise charitable assets 
before it is too much? In passing all of the private foundation excise 
taxes, Congress clearly answered “yes” to all of these questions and tried 
to draw the lines that are only now faintly seen in the social enterprise 
context. 
The social enterprise debate highlights the continuing desire for 
legal frameworks that provide the nonprofit sector with the flexibility295 
to foster innovation in addressing social need with the attendant danger 
of diversion of charitable assets and attention—the same concerns 
present in the debate over Code Section 4943 in the 1960s. Although 
traditional pluralism concerns may, to some, seem outmoded, they 
appear to be alive and well in this modern form. If these discussions are 
distilled down to a general framework, any revisions to Code Section 
4943 to address LLCs should: 
• ensure organizational attention to charitable purpose;
• while allowing for flexibility to pursue charitable purposes;
• minimize the potential for subtle acts of self-dealing not
otherwise captured by Code Section 4941; and
• allow for modern investment activities that provide for a
reasonable inflation-adjusted return at an appropriate level of
risk, all while
• provide clear guidance for the IRS, the donating public,
private foundations and the rest of the nonprofit sector, and
 295.  Benjamin M. Leff, Preventing Private Inurement in Tranched Social Enterprises, 45 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 3 (2015) (citing Robert A. Wexler, Social Enterprise: A Legal Context, 54 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 233, 233 (2006) (the tax regime applicable to nonprofits “is sometimes not 
flexible enough to accommodate . . . new ideas and methods”)) (new social enterprise entities are 
“‘deregulatory,’ in the sense that the new business forms are intended to free social enterprise from 
a variety of laws that constrain the ‘traditional’ nonprofit sector”); Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 8, at 
427 (“Hybrids are widely lauded for their ability to aid entrepreneurs seeking better solutions to 
social needs due to their simplicity and flexibility”); Kelley, supra note 283, at 340-41 (social 
enterprise “entrepreneurs claim to inhabit a frontier where outmoded law and inappropriate old-style 
legal entities hamstring their socially transformative plans”). 
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the investment community. 
With these goals established by a framework of pluralism as originally 
professed by Congress in 1965, and updated and informed by the 
concerns about the interaction of business and charity as voiced in the 
debate over social enterprise, it is possible to evaluate the alternatives to 
the treatment of LLCs under Code Section 4943. 
B. The Unincorporated Association Route 
One could simply take the language of Code Section 4943 at face 
value and treat LLCs as that which they are: unincorporated business 
enterprises. Clearly, Congress contemplated that there would be 
ownership structures that would not fall into one of the neat categories of 
corporation and partnership, which would need to be addressed in some 
manner. Given that a statutory catch-all category exists, it seems like the 
obvious answer would be to use it. 
This approach overestimates the value of the catch-all category. If 
one looks at the types of abuses that Congress considered at the time of 
the passage of Section 4943, this category appears to have been intended 
for trusts and co-ownership arrangements, especially for real property.296 
At no point does it appear there was any thought that Code Section 4943 
needed the flexibility to address emerging forms of business ownership, 
although it may have been a happy by-product of the statutory language. 
The use of the term “beneficial interest” as the statutory measure of 
permitted holdings provides private foundations with little guidance as 
to how to comply. 
For this reason, there does not appear to have been the level of 
Congressional focus on the manner in which permitted holdings should 
be calculated for any of the non-corporate holdings, not to mention the 
other unincorporated business enterprise provisions. All of the focus, as 
demonstrated in Part II of this Article, was on corporate holdings, with 
barely a mention of the partnership, never mind other potential forms of 
business ownership. 
By focusing on beneficial interest as the measure of ownership, the 
unincorporated association rules do not address the fundamental 
concerns that Congress had when passing Code Section 4943 in the LLC 
context. If the primary concern is control (and the attendant diversion of 
 296.  For example, see the co-ownership and real estate easement examples in the 1965 Report. 
The language chosen for the statute—”beneficial interest”—comports with this understanding. 1965 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 19-20, 30. 
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attention), the beneficial interest rule does not address that issue in any 
way. This may be a fundamental flaw of both Section 4943(c)(3)(A) and 
Section 4943(c)(3)(C), in that both the partnership and the other 
unincorporated entity rules focus on economic interest and not on 
control.297 At least in the context of the general partnership, it may have 
been reasonable to conclude at the time that control would follow 
beneficial interest, although clearly the limited partnership was there for 
consideration. 
The control issue becomes even more pronounced with the LLC, 
however, given that the strength of the LLC from a state law perspective 
is flexibility in both economic structure and governance while 
preserving corporate-style limited liability. The LLC provides more 
significant opportunities for combinations of economic interest and 
governance control than ever before, which may not have been 
contemplated given Congress’ understanding of business structures 
available at the time. 
Simultaneously, the unincorporated business entity rules of Section 
4943(c)(3)(C) are too narrow for modern investing practice, as they do 
not allow for a private foundation to have an analog to non-voting 
interests. It is not uncommon for private foundations to invest through 
hedge funds, and other collective investment vehicles, which can be in 
LLC form. Private foundations have very little control over the 
investments in these funds—in some instances, foundations struggle to 
even know what the fund holds.298 It does not appear that Congress 
intended to curb legitimate and accepted means of investing the 
foundation’s portfolio through Code Section 4943. Rather, Section 4943 
should be able to adapt and encourage modern investment portfolio 
theories and techniques, while limiting direct control over operating 
businesses, which the unincorporated association route may not do. 
C. Respect Check-the-Box 
The path of least resistance would be simply to respect the 
classification of an entity under the check-the-box regime. Corporations 
would continue to be corporations; partnerships (both limited and 
general) would be partnerships. LLCs, to the extent not disregarded, 
would be partnerships unless the specific LLC had checked the box to 
elect corporate treatment. Permitted holdings in the LLC would then be 
analyzed under either the corporate rules of Section 4943(c)(2) or the 
297.  Banoff, supra note 212, at 254. 
298.  See id. at 209 n.90. 
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partnership rules of Section 4943(c)(3)(A). The other unincorporated 
business entity rules of Section 4943(c)(3)(C) simply would not apply. 
The benefit of this approach is that it utilizes the existing mechanics 
of Section 7701, with which one assumes most LLCs are already 
familiar. It allows the entity the flexibility to order its affairs in the 
manner most appropriate to its business model and to take advantage of 
the governance innovations inherent in LLCs. It would also be easy to 
administer, as the classification of the LLC and the analysis of permitted 
holdings would be relatively mechanical once the tax classification of 
the entity was established. Finally, it comports with the general 
understanding of the scope of the check-the box rules—they apply for all 
federal tax purposes unless specifically excepted by regulation. 
This model is also inherently flawed for two reasons. While the 
simplicity and symmetry of the approach is compelling, it does not 
adequately address Congress’ fundamental concern about active 
involvement of private foundations in business affairs. 
In the case of the LLC taxed as a partnership, the concern over 
active involvement flows from the original statutory choice to judge 
permitted holdings of pass-through entities based on economic interest 
rather than governance control. While economic interest and governance 
control may often coincide, that is certainly not a result mandated by 
state statute. In the case of the unincorporated enterprise, Congress had 
to assume that beneficial interest and governance control would align—
it had no basis upon which to presume otherwise—and it guarded 
against the possibility by not allowing for an analogous holding similar 
to non-voting stock.299 As discussed previously,300 it appears that an 
LLC could be set up to give voting rights to the holders of the capital 
interest of the LLC. As the statute provides that capital interests in the 
LLC taxed as a partnership are analogous to non-voting stock, these 
interests could be unlimited so long as 20% or less of the profits interest 
is held by disqualified persons.301 
If an LLC checks the box to be taxed as a corporation, then 
permitted holdings would be determined based upon the power to elect 
the “directors” of the organization.302 But who are the “directors” of an 
LLC? In an LLC with voting equity members and a Board of Managers 
 299.  Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(3)(A) (2012) (allowing for capital interests to be treated as 
nonvoting stock for partnerships) with id. § 4943(c)(3)(C) (not allowing an analogous interest for 
nonvoting stock in the case of other unincorporated enterprises). 
300.  See supra Part II.E.2. 
301.  26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(3)(A) & (c)(3)(C). 
302.  Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(b)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2009). 
54
Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss3/2
2015] BETTER LATE THAN NEVER 539 
elected by the members, we can treat the members as shareholders and 
the Board of Managers as the directors. But what if the LLC operating 
agreement seriously limits the power delegated to the manager, so that 
office is more akin to a chief administrator rather than a policy setting 
body? Should we disregard the manager and treat the members as both 
“directors” and “shareholders”? But in such a case, or in the case of a 
member-managed LLC, the members are not elected—they have 
governance rights because they are, essentially, shareholders. In that 
case how does the corporate voting test (a vote for the directors) apply? 
If a foundation did not have the right to vote for the “directors”—
whomever they may be—then all of the foundation’s holdings would be 
permitted holdings if only 20% of the voting equity was held by 
disqualified persons.303 For example, assume that the manager in a 
manager-managed LLC is deemed to be the “director” for purposes of 
determining what voting stock might be. If 80% of the power to vote for 
the manager is given to non-disqualified persons (such as a sibling, 
niece, or nephew of the founding donor304), could the foundation retain 
all other powers of governance inherent to a member and be able to hold 
an unlimited amount of such equity? Given the almost unlimited ability 
to tailor the governance of the LLC as desired, query whether the 
corporate voting test, without further definition, is adequate addresses 
the concern about corporate control inherent in Code Section 4943 for 
LLCs taxed as corporations. 
In either case, the potential for mischief in the form of retained 
foundation control seems apparent. It may be that this mischief is 
ultimately restrained, for the most part, by the limitation that only 20% 
of the voting interest (however it is ultimately defined) in an LLC is 
taxed as a corporation305 or 20% of the profits interest of a partnership 
may be owned by disqualified persons.306 Even so, the ambiguity 
remains problematic for those foundations that are interested in investing 
in LLCs as a matter of an allocation to an alternative equity investment 
as part of its regular portfolio. 
303.  See id.; 26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(3)(C). 
 304.  For purposes of determining a foundation’s disqualified persons, the definition of a 
“member of the family” for purposes of Code Section 4943 does not include the siblings of a 
substantial contributor or foundation manager, or any of the sibling’s descendants. Compare 26 
U.S.C. § 4943 with 26 U.S.C. § 4958(f)(4) (2012) (including siblings and their spouses within the 
meaning of member of the family for purposes of the excess benefit transaction excise tax 
applicable to public charities). 
305.  26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(2). 
306.  Id. § 4943(c)(3)(A). 
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D. A Proposal: Modified Check-the- Box 
Despite its flaws, check-the-box provides clear guidance to private 
foundations with minimal administrative burden to Treasury and is 
consistent with the treatment of entity classification across the Code. 
That being said, LLCs are not corporations, and they are not 
partnerships—that is the strength of the LLC. They allow the flexibility 
to combine economic interest and governance rights in as many varied 
ways as the creative drafter can imagine. Thus, neither the 
unincorporated association option nor a pure check-the-box regime 
sufficiently protects against the issue of business involvement and 
diversion from charitable endeavors. 
In the best of all worlds, the check-the-box rules would be 
respected but the statutory partnership rules would be changed, such that 
the analog to voting stock would be a general partnership interest and the 
analog to non-voting stock would be a limited partnership interest with 
no management rights. Such a test would prevent gamesmanship with 
capital/partnership interest and would provide a bright-line test for 
ownership for both limited partnerships and LLCs taxed as partnerships. 
It would also allow private foundations to invest in modern alternative 
investment opportunities in limited partnership form without limitation. 
Consistent with the current rules, no more than 20% of the general 
partnership interests could be held by disqualified persons. In most such 
cases, the general partner of those partnerships is an unrelated entity that 
is managing the fund; therefore, all of the issues of control and attention 
do not come into play with such an investment, as the limited partner is 
truly a passive investor. 
In the case of LLCs, since there is no general partner with unlimited 
liability, the measure of permitted holdings should depend upon how the 
LLC is organized. In a member-managed LLC, all of the equity owners 
have governance rights by default, and therefore, all should be treated as 
analogous to general partners even though they have no liability. It 
should be possible, however, to draft for a class of membership interest 
in a member-managed LLC that disclaims all governance rights so it 
looks more like a limited partnership interest. By way of example, the 
allowable rights that could be retained by a limited partner might be 
those consent rights currently provided as default rights in the Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act of 2001, which includes admission of partners, 
amendment of the partnership agreement, expulsions, conversion, 
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merger, and dissolution.307 If there are non-management members, then 
those individuals would be treated as non-voting members as long as 
20% or less of the management member interests was held by non-
disqualified persons. 
Similarly, in the case of manager-managed LLCs, the manager or 
the board of managers would be treated as if they were a board of 
directors. Thus, all of the members entitled to vote for the manager 
would be treated as voting shareholders, subject to the 20% rule. To be 
considered a non-voting shareholder with the power to hold unlimited 
amounts of equity, the shareholder must give up more than just the right 
to vote for the manager—rather, the non-voting member must give up all 
governance rights consistent with historical limited partnership status. 
Anyone retaining governance rights beyond these limited rights would 
be treated as a voting member. This rule prevents a situation where the 
manager is stripped of most management rights, effectively making the 
LLC member-managed, but the foundation’s right to vote for a 
placeholder manager is stripped away to comply with the excess 
business holdings rules. Again, this rule effectively addresses the control 
issue for purposes of Code Section 4943 but allows private foundations 
to invest in most third party alternative investment funds. 
Of course, under this scenario, there is a statutory change to Code 
Section 4943(c)(3), so that Treasury’s ability to promulgate regulations 
under that section is not limited to regulations “consistent in principle 
with” the corporate rules, utilizing profits and capital interests as an 
analog to voting and non-voting interests, respectively. Without that 
statutory change, Treasury is stuck using profits and capital as proxies 
for control for both partnerships and LLCs. In such a case, the danger 
lies primarily in giving capital interests (whether in partnerships or 
LLCs) excessive voting control. Thus, Treasury might look to the anti-
abuse regulations of Section 704(e) for inspiration, which provide that 
the transferee of a transfer (by gift or purchase) of a capital interest in a 
capital-intensive partnership will be ignored as a partner for federal 
income tax purposes if the donor, directly or indirectly, retains control 
over the capital through other means.308 In the case of Code Section 
4943, the issue might be reversed—that is, in lieu of stripping the capital 
interest of all governance rights so that the transferor did not relinquish 
dominion and control of the capital interest (as would happen under 
Code Section 704(e)), the profits interests are stripped of all governance 
307.  UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 302 (2001) (amended 2013). 
308.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iii) (as amended in 2013). 
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rights and given to the capital interests. In such a scenario, the capital 
interests would not be treated as transferred to the foundation but would 
be deemed to be retained by the original transferor. 
While the application of such an anti-abuse rule would address the 
control issue inherent in evaluating an LLC under an economic standard, 
it could be argued that such a facts-and-circumstances rule does not give 
sufficient guidance to the foundation. However, the transfer of a naked 
capital interest imbued with excessive governance rights to a private 
foundation, with only 20% of the profits interest retained by disqualified 
persons with respect to the foundation, does not appear to be the type of 
transaction that would occur in the normal course. Rather, it would 
likely occur in the context of a family transfer. One might argue in retort 
that it is exactly the type of transaction that should be made difficult to 
undertake in order to avoid those “subtle forms” of self-dealing that 
Code Section 4943 was intended to capture.309 
If the LLC checks the box as a corporation, then it would be 
allowed to have an unlimited amount of non-voting stock so long as 
non-disqualified persons owned less than 20% of the voting stock. In the 
corporate context, voting stock was determined on the basis of the ability 
to vote for the governing body of the corporation. As mentioned earlier, 
given the flexibility of governance inherent in the LLC form, the regular 
corporate rules that equated voting for a director with control are 
insufficient, especially in the case of a member-managed LLC where 
there are no directors. An LLC governed by its members looks more like 
a general partnership than a corporation for control purposes. 
Accordingly, the non-voting share rule should apply only to those LLCs 
that are governed primarily by a manager or board of managers. As 
described above, the regulations could provide a safe harbor that would 
recognize a class of membership interest that would be “non-voting” if 
they retained only those interests akin to limited partnership rights310—
even if the LLC were member managed or the LLC was not primarily 
governed by a board of managers. Again, this should give most 
309.  1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 7. 
 310.  Alternatively, one could provide that the voting members in a manager-managed LLC 
would only have those powers set forth in the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) (amended 
2013) or those rights that are given to the members by default in the Revised Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act (2006) (amended 2013), without regard to changes that might be made in 
the LLC’s articles of organization or operating agreement. This, however, seems to be much less of 
a bright-line test than the list of enumerated powers set forth in ULPA. Additionally, reference to 
default rules in an enabling statute would mean that the definition of voting might vary by 
jurisdiction, depending upon what changes a state made to the LLC enabling act when adopting it, 
which in turn could encourage foundation forum shopping and the unequal treatment of taxpayers. 
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foundations the flexibility to invest in alternative investments that are 
run by third party managers without violating the control mechanisms to 
be addressed by Code Section 4943. 
V. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION 
Much has happened since 1969 when Section 4943 was first 
enacted: LLCs arrived, the corporate tax rate is on par with the highest 
marginal individual income tax rates, and the check-the-box regime 
governs entity classification. Outside of law, foundation investing has 
turned away from old fiduciary ideas of permissible investments to 
prudent investment rules, total return investing, and allocations to 
alterative equity holdings. 
Although the world has changed, the fundamental concerns 
expressed in the 1960s—preventing distraction by business opportunities 
and undue benefit to private parties while preserving flexibility to invest 
and innovate—remain relevant today, as evidenced by the fact that these 
themes appear in contemporaneous debate regarding social enterprise. 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to keep these considerations in mind 
even today while formulating amendments to Code Section 4943. 
In the best of all worlds, Congress could amend Section 4943 to 
address all the changes that have occurred in the tax and investment 
world since its initial passage. Congress could include provisions that 
specifically provide for LLCs and, while it is at it, reconsider the manner 
in which Section 4943 approaches other pass-through entities, such as 
limited partnerships. 
In lieu of Congressional action, Treasury can clarify by 
administrative action the manner in which it approaches the Section 
4943 analysis for LLCs. Such a pronouncement would at least provide 
some direction for those private foundations with sophisticated 
investment portfolios for which the technical distinction may make 
significant difference. While such guidance would be better than 
nothing, it would not address the fundamental concerns raised by 
Congress in 1969 that remain relevant today: How much involvement in 
business activities is permissible? How can we allow foundations to 
invest wisely while ensuring that they remain appropriately focused on 
charitable endeavors? 
A modified check-the-box approach to the application of Section 
4943, as described in Part IV.C above, would provide appropriate 
guidance, administrative ease, and the flexibility to invest foundation 
assets in most third party investment opportunities in an appropriate 
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manner. While a pure check-the-box methodology runs the possibility of 
allowing too much involvement of a foundation in business activities, 
thus running afoul of Congressional intent as expressed in 1965, a 
modified method geared specifically at the issue of allocating 
governance rights in a manner to manipulate the statute could provide a 
sufficient curb on involvement in business governance as to prevent 
undue distraction. Moreover, it would follow the modern trend of 
allowing foundations to adopt business methodologies that further 
charitable purposes, while not ignoring the appropriate distinctions 
between business and charity altogether. 
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VI. APPENDIX
Text of 26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(1), (2), and (3) (2012) 
(c) Excess business holdings. For purposes of this section— 
(1) In general. The term “excess business holdings” means, with 
respect to the holdings of any private foundation in any business 
enterprise, the amount of stock or other interest in the enterprise which 
the foundation would have to dispose of to a person other than a 
disqualified person in order for the remaining holdings of the foundation 
in such enterprise to be permitted holdings. 
(2) Permitted holdings in a corporation 
(A) In general. The permitted holdings of any private foundation in 
an incorporated business enterprise are— 
(i) 20 percent of the voting stock, reduced by 
(ii) the percentage of the voting stock owned by all disqualified 
persons. 
In any case in which all disqualified persons together do not own 
more than 20 percent of the voting stock of an incorporated business 
enterprise, nonvoting stock held by the private foundation shall also be 
treated as permitted holdings. 
(B) 35 percent rule where third person has effective control of 
enterprise. 
If— 
(i) the private foundation and all disqualified persons together do 
not own more than 35 percent of the voting stock of an incorporated 
business enterprise, and 
(ii) it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that effective 
control of the corporation is in one or more persons who are not 
disqualified persons with respect to the foundation, 
then subparagraph (A) shall be applied by substituting 35 percent 
for 20 percent. 
(C) 2 percent de minimis rule. A private foundation shall not be 
treated as having excess business holdings in any corporation in which it 
(together with all other private foundations which are described in 
section 4946(a)(1)(H)) owns not more than 2 percent of the voting stock 
and not more than 2 percent in value of all outstanding shares of all 
classes of stock. 
(3) Permitted holdings in partnerships, etc. The permitted 
holdings of a private foundation in any business enterprise which is not 
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incorporated shall be determined under regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary. Such regulations shall be consistent in principle with 
paragraphs (2) and (4), except that— 
in the case of a partnership or joint venture, “profits interest” shall 
be substituted for “voting stock”, and “capital interest” shall be 
substituted for “nonvoting stock”, 
in the case of a proprietorship, there shall be no permitted holdings, 
and 
(C) in any other case, “beneficial interest” shall be substituted for 
“voting stock”. 
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